Nagel’s Sexual Perversion
Regine Apeah
500514075
Ryerson University
Nagel’s Sexual Perversion
Regine Apeah
500514075
Ryerson University

The idea of sexually perverse acts can only be understood after grasping the concept of sexual desires amongst humans. Nagel (1969) mentions that like hunger, sexual desire has its characteristic object a certain relationship with something in the external world; sexual desire is a feeling about other people. The object of sexual attraction is a particular person that has features that make them attractive (Nagel, 1969). For example when different people are attracted to a person for different reasons, it’s ultimately because of the person. It’s important to know that not any person can be substituted as an object for sexual desire, and one cannot transfer an old desire to a new person, although the same desire and arousal will occur, it will be a new attraction with a new person (Nagel, 1969). According to Nagel (1969), sexual desire involves a kind of perception; there is the model of mutual desire and blanketed mutual perceptions of both oneself and the object- this brings about the “complex system of superimposed mutual perceptions” (Nagel, 1969, p. 10). In order to be sexually aware of someone, one must first be aware of themselves; this is the Romeo and Juliet scenario (Nagel, 1969). This explains why it is important that the partner is aroused, but also being aroused by one’s desire- it entails “multi-level interpersonal awareness” (Nagel, 1969). Sex serves many purposes and functions; by analysing such relation is the only way one can fully recognize sexual perversion (Nagel, 1969).
Nagel believes that countless familiar unconventionality creates shorten or incomplete versions of the complete configuration of sex as communication, and consequently may be regarded to as perversions (Nagel, 1969). There are criteria for something to be considered perversion and it includes: must be unnatural in some sense, must accommodate the clear cases like shoe fetishism, bestiality, sadism; and exclude the normal cases, and it must be an unnatural sexual inclination; an expression of an unnatural sexual preference (Nagel, 1969, p.5). “Reflexive mutual recognition” is when desires are reciprocated by both parties involved, without mutuality sexual perversion arises (Nagel, 1969, p.12). Examples of sexual perversion include sex with animals, children and inanimate objects as they do not go past the first stage. Inanimate objects have no awareness, animals and children can be aware, but they are not able to cognitively recognize they are the source of arousal and reciprocate the desire (Nagel, 1969). Exhibitionism is also perverse because one is only concerned about attracting attention to oneself by displaying one’s genital in public; there is only one party involved, which is being aroused. An act that could not be considered sexually perverse is homosexuality. Nagel suggests that there is no reason for thinking homosexuality is a perversion, as it fulfills reflexive mutual recognition the same as heterosexuals, it is just that one is being aroused by someone with a similar body as their own (Nagel, 1969). As sexual perversions are psychological and not physiological sterility, miscarriage, contraception and abortion are not sexual perversions (Nagel, 1969).
Nagel was criticized by different philosophers such as Robert Solomon. Solomon was in agreeance with Nagel on certain things, but he states that Nagel’s analysis is both cautious and competent, he doesn’t mention sex this is only inferred, this is empty content (Solomon, 1974). Based on the idea of empty content, one could say that the Romeo and Juliet scenario could be seen as perverse, because sexual intercourse is only implicitly mentioned, one can go through all stages and it not lead to sexual intercourse on a constant bases, therefore making it perverse. The lack of content within Nagel’s account makes this unsuccessful. Solomon (1974) also mentions that the end desire is interpersonal communication about attitudes and feelings and less about enjoyment (Solomon, 1974), whereas Nagel sees sex as communication, which fails to include the idea of the relationship a masochist and sadist have where they are both aroused; making Nagel’s definition of what is sexually perverse narrow. Moreover, Janice Moulton (1976) criticizes Nagel’s account for sexual desire by first identifying that his account assumes the model of flirtation and seduction but sexual desire can come from many different things other than a person such as a smell, or a phrase from a book. Nagel does not address different aspects of sexual desires, therefore supporting the idea that this was an unsuccessful account of sexual perversion, as it is hard to address in diverse circumstances.

References
Nagel, T. ‘Sexual Perversion’, The Journal of Philosophy, 66.1 (1969), pp. 5-17.
Soble, A. (1980). The Philosophy of sex: Contemporary readings (4th ed.). Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Solomon, R. ‘Sexual Paradigms’, The Journal of Philosophy, 71.11 (1974), pp. 336-345.