Socrates on Piety in Justice

Towards the end of Plato’s dialogue The Euthyphro, Socrates takes the lead in a debate regarding what defines pious action and uncharacteristically gives significant insight to his own thoughts on what he believes piety to be and its relation to justice. As Socrates poses leading questions on the subject, Euthyphro attempts to reach a concrete definition of piety. At one point he comes very close to doing so, but Socrates quickly and perhaps deliberately changes the direction of the argument back towards uncertainty and confusion. As is the case with most of the Socratic Dialogues, The Euthyphro ends before an agreed conclusion is reached.
Towards the end of the dialogue Euthyphro has grown weary of the debate. In an attempt to keep the conversation from losing all momentum, Socrates leads him to assert that piety is only a part of the larger set of justice (12d). This means that what is pious is necessarily just, but what is just is not necessarily pious. Afterwards, Euthyphro defines piety as the part of justice “concerned with tending to the gods, while the remaining part of the just if concerned with tending to human beings” (12e). Socrates focuses on Euthyphro’s use of the word “tend”, and uses his typical method of scrutinization to force Euthyphro into a corner. The argument follows that all tending shares the same aim of benefiting the thing being tended. Therefore, a man’s pious action would actually make the gods better.
Euthyphro is quick to deny this (13c); he argues that we do not tend to the gods in the same sense that a master tends for his animal, but rather in the sense that “slaves provide to their masters” (13d). This distinction is essential, as it would be sacrilegious to suggest that the gods require mans assistance.
Euthyphro clarifies that a pious act is one of service to the gods and not an act of caring for them, but he cannot provide an answer when Socrates asks him to specify the goal that the service of piety seeks to accomplish. Instead he declares that pious action is done through prayer and sacrifice, and makes a very interesting correlation. He says that acts similar to piety “preserve both the private welfare of households and the common welfare of the city, whereas those that are the opposite… destroy everything.” (14b) This sentence is a clear description of what justice aims to do, and it comes close to providing a satisfactory answer to Socrates’ question.
Socrates even goes so far as to admit that Euthyphro nearly arrived at an acceptable answer, but then immediately redirects the focus toward the first half of Euthyphro’s response concerning the “knowledge of sacrificing and praying” (14c). Had Euthyphro continued to list what is common to both just and pious acts, it would have been possible for him to discover what is specific to piety alone while maintaining his definition of it as an act of service. To do this, he should have given the following reply:
“While justice is concerned with every aspect of preserving the welfare of a population, the sub-set of piety aims to preserve the population of man only in regards to man’s relationship with the gods. It is through prayer and sacrifice that man provides service to the gods and remains in their good grace. In return, man asks for mercy from the gods and at times even for their assistance. This is not to say that the gods are in need of our prayer and sacrifice; but it is nonetheless pleasing to them, just as it is pleasing to any being to be both respected and appreciated for one’s power and achievements. On the other hand, the benefit man gains from pious action is absolutely necessary for his existence, for without the mercy of the gods all of mankind would perish. In this way it is evident that while both may benefit from one another, only man requires the service of the gods, whereas the gods do not require the service of man.” This reply maintains Euthyphro’s position that piety is a service as well as a subset of justice, and even specifies the intended goal that piety seeks to accomplish. It also avoids making any statements that could be considered heresy. Consequently, it would have adequately answered all of the questions posed by Socrates up to that point in the dialogue and left him without many options to refute Euthyphro’s stance. Another interesting interpretation of Euthyphro’s correlation between piety and the preservation of welfare arises when pursued through an atheistical perspective. Suppose piety does not exist in the sense that it aims to preserve mankind, but rather it aims to ensure the preservation of the gods. This seems much more likely to be the case when one considers the undeniable lack of empirical and historical evidence to support the notion that deities exist and affect our lives. From this viewpoint it appears that the perceived existence of the gods is perpetuated solely through the passing of traditions of pious actions from generation to generation. If all of mankind stopped pursuing pious action, all religious order would eventually crumble, and so too would belief in God. That is, of course, assuming that a deity does not descend from above and restore belief. Obviously, this would not have been the view of Euthyphro. But, supposing this debate substantially altered his opinion of Socrates, Euthyphro could claim this to be a belief of Socrates and use it against him during his upcoming trial. Based on Socrates’ questions and statements made throughout the dialogue, it wouldn’t be difficult to argue that he doesn’t believe in true piety. Euthyphro’s core mistake was allowing himself to be misled just as he began to uncover the truth of what defines pious action. Had he remained focused on the aspects shared between the goal of piety and the goal of justice, he could have developed a clear and strong argument. However, in accordance with his reputation, Socrates successfully questioned the other party into confusion until Euthyphro finally excused himself, most likely feeling somewhat angry towards Socrates and to some degree embarrassed of his failure to define the very subject of his expertise. It was the infliction of these very sentiments that eventually led to Socrates’ trial and execution.

Bibliography

1. C.D.C. Reeve, Peter Meineck, James Doyle, Plato, Aristophanes, and Xenophon. "Euthyphro." The Trials of Socrates: Six Classic Texts. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2002. Print. 2. Debra Nails. "Socrates." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 7 Nov. 2009. Web. 22 Feb. 2012. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/>