720th Special Tactics Strategic Analysis

The 720 Special Tactics Group Strategic Analysis

Strategic Planning

OM 5040

Table of Contents

Abstract 3

Introduction 4

Background 4

History 7

Organization 11

Mission statement 13

Mission 13

Mission Task 13

Vision statement analysis 15
Strategic management Application 17

Value Chain 18

Primary Activities 18

Support Activities 19
Translating Performance into Competitive Advantages 19
Conclusion 20

References 23

Abstract Leadership regardless of packaging, whether it be military, commercial or administrative is a required capability of anyone who posses responsibility to provide a product, service or a contractual obligation. In this vein of thought, the military leader not only has the responsibility to provide a service, such as protecting America, a contractual obligation to the American people, such as constantly being on vigilance, but also has a responsibility to account to the people for whom he has been entrusted to lead. The mission of the Air Force’s premier battlefield warriors is to provide the Joint Force Commander with austere air traffic control; assault zone (landing zone/drop zone) survey, close air support and personnel recovery. In this paper the vision statement will provide guidance and the expectation necessary to show how the Commander is maintaining his responsibility to lead Airmen into the future and achieve airpower dominance.

Introduction In this paper a short history of military leadership should be explained to provide the reader an introduction to the topic of leadership in the military. Additionally, this paragraph should provide insight into the importance of leadership at all levels of the military and how leadership has vital significance regardless of its immediate value. Leadership regardless of packaging, whether it be military, commercial or administrative is a required capability of anyone who posses responsibility to provide a product, service or a contractual obligation. In this vein of thought, the military leader not only has the responsibility to provide a service, such as protecting America, a contractual obligation to the American people, such as constantly being on vigilance, but also has a responsibility to account to the people for whom he has been entrusted to lead. Historically, military leadership was a top-down, centrally controlled monolith, which was managed by abusive autocrats and micromanaging dictators (Cowper, p. 231, 2000). While the military has had great success in leadership both on and off the field of battle, the failures provide a unique perspective to the weakness of poor leadership and the eventual outcomes. Background An example of abusive autocrat is that of Napoleon III. In the 1870’s the French Army was commanded by Napoleon III and in July he declared war on Prussia. By August suffering from several defeats, his army divided, he relinquished command of the Army of the Rhine to Franc, ois Achille Bazaine, a Field Marshall who had never commanded more than 21,000 troops, was now in command of 150,000 troops. In October of 1870, under the Command of Field Marshall Bazaine, the Army of the Rhine surrendered (Prince, p. 102, 2005). The eventual capitalization of the Army of the Rhine was a direct link to Napoleons narcissistic autocratic, top-down leadership style. According to Prince, there was a two-fold reason for Frances’ defamation. The first was the French higher commands expectation of a single military leader at the top of the pyramid developing the plans and issuing the orders (p. 104, 2005). For this style of leadership Napoleon was second to none, he issued orders, undercut his Field Marshalls and interfered in all the nuisances of the battlefield, justifiably creating uncertainty in his Field Marshalls ability to lead and command (Prince, p. 100, 2005). The second reason for failure is that of Bazaine’s leadership. While Bazaine was credited with great success in counter-insurgency and short warfare operations, he was clearly not prepared for strategic level of command requiring detailed planning in logistics, organizational skills in managing large scale troops on the battle field, and the initiative and self confidence necessary to counter-command previously dictated orders, simply stated “because someone has done well in one type of command does not mean he will do well in another” (Prince, p. 105, 2005). An example of micro-management is that of the hostage rescue in 1979, of sixty-six Americans taken from a U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran. While the rescue was aborted due to lack of a set number of helicopters leaving from Desert Base 1, to prosecute the mission, the overarching analysis was a lack of decentralized authority and increased level of micromanagement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (p. 393, Nalty, 1997). While the plan to rescue the sixty-six hostages, was daring and gallant, it was foiled from the beginning due to complex and inflexible plans, operators having trained with equipment differently from what they would use during the mission, security classifications forcing all operators to train privately and in geographically separated regions of the U.S. and finally the intelligence was limited and untrustworthy (p.395, Nalty, 1997). While these failures and many others have led to improvements in military leadership they have typically come at a high price. Organizations typically lack the resolve to change in the face of success, especially when the change will cause great turmoil. Repeated success tends to breed contempt, a high-mindness that to continue success one only has to repeat the process of the past. This inept leadership led to the down fall of the French Army, who based their successes during colonial warfare, as a precedent to success against the Prussian army; the American military failure, to collectively harmonize multiple agencies against a single enemy in Teheran, Iran, based on assumptions of past successes. The leadership lesson to be garnered from these historical perspectives, is that in the face of success one must be able to evaluate himself and change even if it means accepting one’s own faults and have the flexibility and maturity to change as the face of the battle changes. The Air Force leader who moves from the battle field to the support role must create atmospheres conducive to creative thinking, individual initiative, and even audacious independent action, because in the end this is what allows a smaller, less supported operator to overcome a larger more formidable force. (Special Operations Truths, author unknown)
720 Special Tactics Group History
World War II

Each of the 720th Special Tactics Group’s (STG) three specialized combat forces can trace their origins to World War II. Combat controllers point to the Pathfinders – paratroop forces infiltrating at predetermined assault area to guide the remainder of the force – as the first of their kind. (p.62, Schlight, 2003) Also born of necessity, pararescuemen (PJs) conducted their first missions in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of the Pacific. (p. 3, Tilford,1992) There, a doctor and two corpsmen parachuted into the jungle to find, treat, and recover the crew of a downed aircraft. As with the rest of the military, these units faced a reduction of their forces or outright disestablishment following the end of the war.

From Korea to Rice Bowl

In the years after World War II, the United States fought two military actions and numerous “Cold War” battles that were largely traditional warfare.
Korea was fought in the manner of large land battles without widespread use of unconventional warriors. Of the three STG specialties, PJs were the only ones to see action in this campaign – largely in the conventional combat search and rescue arena. (p. 109, Tilford, 1992) In Vietnam, all three career fields saw resurgence. Combat controllers worked with Army ground forces and airlift forces and served as forward air controllers. PJs conducted rescues almost daily. Air Commando weathermen plied their trade, establishing an indigenous weather network throughout Southeast Asia.

Once again, the end of a “hot” war saw the demobilization of unconventional forces. In the sands of Iran at a place called Desert One, the United States would learn a hard lesson in the value of maintaining a combat ready special operations force.

Tragedy at Desert One

President James E. Carter responded to the taking of American hostages in Iran with a bold military rescue plan called Operation Rice Bowl. Combat controllers from a newly conceived team designed to support “Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises” mapped a dirt airstrip, cleared the “runway,” and controlled airplanes and helicopters onto a desert site deep in Iran. Unfortunately, the mission was called off and a subsequent aircraft collision killed five aircrew members and three Marines. The need for a strong special operations force resourced and led by a single commander was one of the main lessons drawn from this operation.

Forging a Special Tactics Unit

In 1983, President Ronald W. Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada to restore order to the island and to rescue American students stranded there. During Operation Urgent Fury, combat controllers jumped with Army Rangers, secured a major airport and worked with Navy SEALs in a weather aborted attempt at an amphibious landing. The lessons of Urgent Fury – added to those of Rice Bowl – led to the creation of the United States Special Operations Command and, in October 1987, the 1720th Special Tactics Group. Comprised of two combat control squadrons and a pararescue squadron, the Group – for a short time – reaped the benefits of combined operations. Barely two years later however, Air Rescue Service reclaimed the pararescue unit. The value of placing PJs with combat control teams would have to be leaned again. In 1989-90, the 1720th and its two remaining squadrons, participated in Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama.

Once again, the need for embedded PJs within combat control teams was highlighted in combat. In April 1990 the 23d Air Force (now Air Force Special Operations Command-AFSOC) filled this need, moving all of its assigned PJs into the Group’s Special Tactics squadrons. The Special Tactics triad was completed in 1996 when the 10th Combat Weather Squadron joined the 720th (renamed in 1992). At last Air Force Special Tactics trained and fought together.

September 11th and Beyond

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 720 STG has been at the forefront of nearly all major operations. Combat controllers have orchestrated more than 800 tactical air control strikes, delivering in excess of 2 million tons of explosives against enemy positions. They conducted surveys and assessments at more than 40 airfields and landing zones, controlling more than 14,000 sorties from these areas. Working with American and allied forces, controllers conducted missions in forward, denied territory vital to the successful prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom missions.

Pararescuemen have flown countless missions in support of infiltrating forces, successfully conducting numerous combat rescue missions: jumping into minefields, infiltrating urban structures laden with explosives, remaining on a hill top above ten thousand feet protecting injured soldiers who could not be evacuated and eventually being overcome by enemy forces and even conducting combat dives in central Bagdad to recover injured soldiers, all the while exposing themselves to enemy directed firepower.

Special operations weathermen wore some of the first American boots to touch Afghan soil. Their observations and forecast were, at times, the only meteorological information available to war planners and proved to be the enabling factor in many missions. In Iraq, the weathermen operated from forward positions and moved with coalition forces, accurately forecasting weather conditions for vital military operations.

Today, the 720 STG continues to conduct missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations world-wide. At home, research, development, and testing projects conducted by Group personnel will provide future Battlefield Airmen with the technological and operational edge needed to maintain battlefield supremacy. Innovations such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Machine to Machine targeting, Battlefield Air Operations kits, Advanced Skills Training, and Human Patient Simulators will ensure Special Tactics will always be…First There…That Others May Live
Current Organization Military operations are unique in the world of leadership and management in that the employee and employer share a central common bond, in that, each one is dependent on the other for survival. In no other situation, can an employer and his employee, unequivocally place such loyalty and trust in the others capability to accomplish their assigned task. This unique perspective places unusual stress between the Officer (employer/leader) and the enlisted (employee/follower) within the context of business management and leadership. In the conflicting moments of battle when confusion and disarray abound, when lives are on the line, there is little time for discussion. In the moments of battle, a leader must give orders to accomplish the mission, save as many lives as possible and the followers must obey without hesitation otherwise total failure could ensue. In the course of war or in the moments of battle, these leaders emerge having developed the characteristics and traits, which others see and are willing to follow. Leadership on the battlefield requires years of training, experience and education. The goal of the military is to train an individual in as little time as possible to make quick and accurate decision based on limited and distorted information. The difficulty for the military is to transcend the line between battlefield leader to office manager for both employer and employee. Many of the same characteristics, experiences, and personal attributes that exemplified an individual as a battlefield leader or follower do not cross correlate into the management operations of the military. An overview of just such a military workplace situation is that of the 720
Operations Support Squadron (OSS). The OSS is a support unit assigned to the 720 Special Tactics Group, which supports eight squadrons in the United
States Air Force (USAF) providing logistics, training, equipment and command and control encompassing over eight hundred and fifty people. Within the 720 OSS, are thirty five individuals who independently provide leadership and expertise in their assigned areas of responsibility? Of these thirty five key positions, the five decision nodes are headed by battlefield leaders with limited management skills, other than within the context of what is taught in basic officer leadership courses. The next seven positions are headed by battlefield operators while extremely endowed with operational experience, lack any formal training in office management, organization and leadership. The remainder of individuals are technicians and contractors hired to perform specific tasks. The primary objective of the 720 OSS is to provide comprehensive solutions to the war fighter in the global environment. These solutions range from the simple, as in form fitting assault packs, to the complex technical requirements such as intuitive batteries which provide power capability to multiple systems regardless of voltage requirements or downlink tools/technology to integrate overhead surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. The 720 OSS provides immediate administrative, logistical and technical support to the operator who is tasked to provide unique skill sets in the joint war fighting community.
Mission Statement

The organizational mission statement is a broad collection of data points that every operator is capable of performing within the command of the 720. However, as a day to day mission statement of what is expected today, to respond to tomorrows threats, there appears to be large and over generously blank requirements. This broad stroke definition gives ample room for individuals and leaders to focus their attention on various tasks none of which may be supportive to the operator.
Mission

The mission is to provide the Joint Force Commander with austere air traffic control; assault zone (landing zone/drop zone) survey, assessment, establishment, and control; close air support using strike aircraft and gunship missions; weather observations; environmental reconnaissance; personnel recovery; and advanced trauma care. Special Tactics Teams operate worldwide, in a ground role with joint and combined special operations task forces.
STTs can be employed in support of the full range of special operations core tasks to include direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, combat search and rescue, personnel/equipment recovery, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs.
Mission Tasks

The following laundry list is an exhaustive run down, of what an individual Special Tactics Team (STT) is required to maintain to meet the intent of the mission statement. This list provides an over-arching capability of what a STT can perform, and how they would inter-face with other Special Operational Units.

• Provide terminal guidance and air traffic control for assault zones (AZ). An AZ may be an established airfield, landing strip, unimproved site, helicopter landing zone, or drop zone. The Special Tactics team can: o Establish ground-to-air communications o Coordinate AZ activities with the ground force commander o Perform weather observations o Provide positive control of personnel and equipment on the airstrip to include control of Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) operations • Select, evaluate, survey, and establish AZs. The Special Tactics Team can: o Clear, mark, and operate the AZ o Establish enroute and terminal navigation aids and beacons o Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions o Support selected regional survey team (RST) missions o Remove obstacles from the airstrip for follow-on operations • Provide medical care, recovery, and evacuation. The STT can: o Provide combat emergency medical and trauma care for up to six individuals for a seventy two hour period o Operate specialized personal locator systems o Operate combat medical evacuation vehicles o Lead search-and-rescue (SAR) security team operations o Conduct casualty transload and evacuation operations o Conduct sensitive recovery operations • Conduct, coordinate, and plan fire support operations. The STT can: o Control close air support (CAS) aircraft o Control naval gunfire o Control artillery and mortar fires o Operate laser targeting equipment o Report battlefield damage assessment • Conduct unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense activities. The team can advise, train, and assist allied or indigenous personnel in: o Assault zone, communications, and other special operations o Combat medical and related casualty treatment procedures o Combat search and rescue operations

The mission statement and the mission task provide clear guidance on what should be expected from a STT. The mission statement provides a comprehensive list of services and products, the Joint Force Commander can expect. The Special Tactics mission statement lays out the here and now of what a STT can perform as high density – low volume force in the modern battle field.
Vision

The vision statement provides guidance on what the entire organization is expected to achieve. The 720 is a combination of various job titles and duties, and all individuals are expected to work together to achieve a single goal: Airpower on the battlefield. The vision statement draws guidelines and expectations of all individuals regardless of position, authority or experience and provides directions, paths and goals on how to achieve this airpower.
Priorities:

-The Mission
-Our People
-Our Families
-Training

Special Tactics of yesterday and today has met with great success by providing critically needed capabilities and extradinary warriors, well suited for the threats and fights at hand.

To maintain relevance, to remain instrumental, Special Tactics of tomorrow must provide the right capabilities and warriors for the threats and fights of the future.

-Transformation: Moving from where we are to where we need to be in 10, 15 years from now and beyond requires four key transformational task; • #1. Understand the environment we are in and seek to understand those of the future • #2. Understand who we are and what we bring to the fight • #3. Have a clear vision of what we must become and what we must provide in the future • #4. Have the will and focus to bring about that vision.
1. Environment: Understand how environments affect operations and seek to predict those of the future. World Environment Threat Environment Technology Environment Military Operations Environment DoD Environment Air Force Environment Special Operations Force Environment
2. Understand who we are and what Special Tactics brings to the fight: The Air Force’s premier ground combat team…integrating, synchronizing and controlling Air and Space power on the battlefield. Airmen providing Airmanship
3. Have a clear vision of what we must become: Roles and Missions Organization Training Equipment Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
4. Have the will and focus to bring about the vision Brief way ahead to entire Special Tactics Force Publish Special Tactics Way Ahead document Training guidance: Special Tactics Group, Operational Support, Squadrons, and Theater Special Tactics Action Plan Periodically review and update based on course corrections

■ Integrate, synchronize and control Air and Space power on the battlefield

■ ST Warrior: Sensor-Shooter-Communicator-Operator

■ ST must provide what ever is required to enable airpower at objective…(Tactical Air Control, Personnel Recovery, Operational Performance Evaluation, Air Traffic Control, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Command, Control, Communicate, Weather Operationss
1. Joint Terminal Air Control Operations ■ increasing role near/mid-term…unknown in long-term ■ Combat Control Team core skill

2. Personnel Recovery ■ Continues as a major part of who we are/what we do ■ Emphasis shifting away from ejected pilot to downed helicopter, Wounded In Action, emergency casualty evacuation ■ Collapsed structure and confined space rescue gain in importance in War On Terror ■ Preparedness for natural disasters.
3. Landing Zone/Drop Zone Assessment, Establishment and Control ■ Increased importance as access strategy and in support of expeditionary operations ■ Survey mission serve as ST access strategy both to geographical areas and to new mission sets

4. Tactical Weather Observation & Forecasting ■ Increasing demand tied to access strategy and expeditionary operations ■ Combat Weather consolidation will result in major advances and synergies
5. Battlefield Trauma Care ■ Continues as major need/mission ■ Requirement for skilled trauma specialist will increase in near to mid-term ■ ST needs unique capabilities of a PJ

6. Command and Control Communications ■ Major increase on horizon…we will step up to role of “information warriors”
7. Information Operations ■ Need capability to access, integrate, enable, control information in future “global information grid” ■ Major future role also for ST Intelligence

8. Reconnaissance & Surveillance ■ Major growth area…WOT increasingly disabled information ■ We must greatly advance our capabilities if we are to remain relevant ■ Expand our PR capability in the R&S environment

Future Focus ■ Remain fully engaged in Battlefield Airman initiatives ■ Look to take on Special Forces Tactical Air Control team as part of ST ■ Involve Security Forces in ST Operations ■ More interoperability with Rescue Squadron ■ Combat Rescue Officer in ST ■ Increase Special Tactics Officer participation in tactical operations ■ Future: provide STT directly to Combat Flying Air Component Commnader

Application

Value Chain Value chain for the 720th is producing Airmen who provide Airmanship to theatre Commanders. Special Forces units in various branches of the Department of Defense have perfected the capabilities of ground and naval offensive/defensive systems. The service provided by Special Tactics is the integration of ground, air & space in the three dimensional immature battle spaces. High density/low volume forces are individuals who single-handedly bring the entire force and pressure of the Air Force upon the enemy. Assigning a Combat Controller to a Special Forces, SEAL or Marine Force Recon team increases the percentage of mission success and safety of the team. Pararescue is in the same category –high density/low volume. Pararescuemen are the only forces tasked by the Department of Defense to provide worldwide recovery capabilities for the military, Americans, coalition forces, national government agencies and other government agencies. The Special Tactics value, is related to Special Tactics ability to leverage one or two individuals in every conflict and effect the outcome of the battle.
Primary Activities The two primary activities which enhance the 720 Special Tactics are operations and distribution. Special Tactics teams maintain the same infiltrations and exfiltration capabilities as other Special Forces teams. This ensures that regardless of where the battle occurs STT’s are able meet the challenges of confronting the enemy in his backyard. In addition to cross-indexed skills, such as parachuting, scuba, and special vehicles STT’s ability to operate independently allow them to work with other forces and not become a burden or a liability. This ability to distribute STT’s worldwide allows theatre commanders to plan and execute operations, with the assurance that airmen will be providing airmanship regardless of where the fighting is occurring.
Support Activities
As directed by the vision statement, research and development is one of the single focus required to ensure the future safety of Special Tactics ability to bring the precision armament upon the enemy and the ability to recover forces who are no longer mission capable.
Translating Performance into Competitive Advantages The value chain of the 720 Special Tactics is to ensure that its’ people are trained, qualified, outfitted to meet the demands of tomorrow. Three initiatives begun in the past three years are to revamp the time required to recruit, select, qualify and outfit individuals as Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen. Special recruiting stations have been developed across the U.S. to recruit specific individuals with the innate abilities to meet the challenges of Special Tactics. Additionally, rather than an individual moving across the country to acquire the training necessary to be qualified as a CCT/PJ, an advanced skill training center has been constructed to house all the necessary training in one facility. Finally, an automated, single supply system has been developed to research, test and provide the individual with his equipment, ensuring he goes to war fully equipped.

Analysis

Strategic Opportunities

The future is bright for a light, highly manuervable and flexible force every ready to assume new roles, responsibilities and mission task. The first oppurtunity is to role new technology into existing capacities to ensure relevance in today operations and that Special Tactics is leading the force and not following. The second oppurtunity is to break the glass walls seperating Special Operations from conventional Air Force assets. From a centralist perspective, conventional and non-convetional forces do not integrate operations and procedures. Therefore, this is an oppurtunity to grow ST as valued member of not only the Special Operations family but also the “Big Blue” Air Force.

Strategic Challenges

The single greatest challenge for the ST leader, greater than overcoming the enemy, in a word, is the human being. Recruiting and retaining the individual who has the physical, mental and psychological make-up necessary to be a Combat Controller or Pararescuemen will be the defining mark on the leaders who fight tomorrow’s battles. Out of the six hundred airmen who attempt to become a CCT or PJ, each year, only six to ten actually complete the required training. Regardless of how exciting it is to be a CCT or PJ, after several years of doing the same thing, it becomes routine, therefore frustration sets in concerning the lack of pay and the constant deployment cycles.
Conclusion
Airpower at the Objective A small force who owns the air and Space over head controls the battle. However, most aircraft have a limited loiter time to remain overhead, therefore, when the small ground team is left to fend for themselves against an equal or superior force the outcome is predetermined. The ability of CCT to independently control the airspace is predicated on the development of small unmanned aerial vehicles systems (SUAVS) with voice activated targeting systems. Currently, the SUAVS have visual capabilities allowing the ground sensor to have ‘eyes on’ the enemy and to remotely target the enemy but not to individually destroy or suppress the enemy. Traditionally, the Army has maintained control of all land based operations. The benefit of a SUAVS, in the hands of an battlefield airman would be the annexing of the need for Army Special Forces. Air Force battlefield operators could insert into an objective and independently control not only the air and space but the surface operations as well. The difficulty in accomplishing this strategic option would be overcoming the political tsunami the Army would have at letting an Airmen mission creep into traditional Army territory. Personnel Recovery The ability of combat forces to prosecute the war in large measure is built on the trust that regardless of what happens, no will be left behind. This becomes even more instrumental, when American bodies are tragically humiliated on public television as propaganda for terrorist and non-state organizations. Therefore, it is of the greatest interest to National Security that forces be premeditatedly emplaced to provide recovery of American forces irrespective of host nation policies or interest. The weakness in this concept is having the right forces, with the right capabilities, in the right place at the right time.
Foreign Internal Defense The ability of terrorism to take root is referenced to a countries financial and political wealth. Countries with high unemployment and politically unstable civil leadership are hot beds for the development of terrorist networks. In the future, strategic competencies should be developed to ensure Air Power can be effectively employed in third world countries, which are not suited to support American forces, for example, potable water, sanitation, communication networks, and infrastructure to support the influx of military forces which might equal the natural inhabitants. The ability of American forces to work along side foreign forces, increases the likelihood of cooperation and trust from the public at large. The difficulty is attempting to eradicate terrorism from its traditional strong holds while simultaneously combating them in their new nesting sites.

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