SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF SCIENCE
IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

J. Sebastian Smith
The Bahamas
October 2011
Title
Strategic Implications from the People’s Republic of China’s Influence in the Americas:
Potential Consequences facing the United States, Brazil &Venezuela
Abstract
This research seeks to examine the strategic implications facing the United States of
America’s due to its benign interest in the Caribbean and Latin America (Americas) given the
People’s Republic of China (China) increasing economic interest in the region. It is intended to first define the current security environment of the Americas and the relations between Brazil and
Venezuela with that of the United States of America (United States) and China. Thereafter,
China’s economic and domestic agenda in the Americas will be examined with hypotheses of the emerging global power potential growth success, challenges or possible collapse in her foreign policy. The likely consequences facing Brazil, Venezuela and the United States will also be

examined. The assessment will be done across a continuum of China’s realized economic growth, development of hostile relations due to competition for scarce energy sources or possible collapse due to the country’s internal problems. Finally, the research seeks to encourage proactive thinking by the United States on China’s increasing political and military influence in the region and its possible underlying agenda of becoming the next global super power or hegemony.

Introduction
A general perception persists in the Caribbean and Latin America that the United States is disinterested in the security of the region with its emphasis placed on the global war on terror in the Middle East – Iraq and Afghanistan. As stated by Flanagan, Michel, Przystop and Cope
(2008), “relations with countries in the southern part of the hemisphere are generally more circumspect, reflecting the pressures of diverse transnational problems that besets the region, as well as vacillations in Washington’s attention and increased sophistication of regional leaders in managing their international relations.” Fraser (2010) also acknowledged that “Latin America, the
Caribbean, and the U.S. share many security interests and security concerns. The region faces a set of persistent challenges such as poverty, crime, corruption, institutional weakness, illicit trafficking, and terrorism.

These challenges complicate their collective efforts to secure the

hemisphere; at the same time, security helps to provide the very means to address these issues…security is essential for stable and prosperous democracies.”
Historically, as stated by Cronin (2009), “the United States took the hemisphere for granted, while also keeping at bay other nations interested in projecting their influence among the states of Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington characterized its habitual policy as
Strategic Denial and used economic and democratic development supported by military presence and security assistance to achieve its goal. With the end of the Cold War, the United States abandoned Strategic Denial and embarked on a search for a modern, sustainable framework based on respect and partnership, recognizing the emergence of more vibrant democratic economies, regional integration, and the spread of globalization.”
Cronin (2009) asserted further that “during the past 20 years, most Latin American and
Caribbean nations have embraced democratic governance and adopted more liberal market policies. This convergence has kept the region moving forward, albeit less impressively than Asia.
Brazil and Mexico, now major global actors, are among several states benefiting from greater economic and trade opportunity. For many smaller countries, particularly among the states circumscribing the Caribbean, relations with the United States have followed demographic, cultural, and economic integration. Some others, mainly in South America, have taken up the banner of populism and denounced the influence of globalization and “savage capitalism” championed by the American superpower. These states promise that the government, rather than the market, would help the poor battle the rich. Set against this often contentious but generally peaceful regional backdrop, Washington policy asserts that if its nearest neighbors are not secure

and stable, then the United States will be less secure.”
However, at present, Washington’s seeming disinterest in the region has created an atmosphere where Caribbean and Latin American states have become more determined to protect their collective interest by reaffirming commitment to previous and newly established strategic regional bodies. Such organizations include the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Regional
Security System (RSS) and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Moreover, this

divergence from Washington’s agenda and exclusion of the United States from policy deliberations coupled with the current economic recession have shaped a political and economic vacuum that has attracted major powers like China, Russia and Iran to the region. Considering this, should the
United States remain passive while China diminishes its role as the hegemony in the region? Given
China’s economic might, domestic agenda and military potential to encroach politically in the
Americas; is the United States prepared to confront the challenges of China creating regional alliances in the Americas, particularly with populist regimes that opposes its national interests while supporting China’s isolation of Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific region?
Literature Review
The United States’ National Security Strategy (2010), states that it “will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China.” “We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that United States interest and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.” Cope and Mora (2009) however, posits that “many experts in the United States and Latin
America believe that Washington has not paid sufficient attention to the Americas in recent years.
They warn that this indifference may prove costly at a time when the region is undergoing political, social and economic transformation. They believe that the United States is projecting a detached, unsympathetic attitude just as democratic legitimacy is weakening across Latin American and populism and anti-Americanism views are gaining momentum. To underscore the potential costs of neglect, some observers point to inroads that China, Russia and Iran have made in regional affairs.” Yet, the dynamics and scope of what is occurring in the region can be defined in terms of

each nation’s foreign policy and subsequent relations with each other. Cronin (2009) reaffirmed the relations in the Americas with the United States as he viewed the Americas as “a complex regional setting with diverse national interests; noted that Latin America and Caribbean nations have embraced democratic governances and adapted more liberal market policies; whereas, others, mainly in South America have embraced populism and denounced the influence of globalization and capitalism influenced by the United States.”
While the United States generally exemplify democratic and liberal principles; its posture regionally and internationally exhibits traits of a realistic state. America’s offensive stance and current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates characteristics of a neorealist as postulated by Kenneth Waltz in International Relations, One World, Many Theories. In this instance, the United States’ actions have and continue to constrain Iraq’s behavior which often conflicts with the current international order. Similarly, despite the end of the Cold War, the
United States still seem poised to respond to any relative gains by rising powers such as China as noted in its National Security Strategy (2010) resulting in a balance-of-power and continual security dilemma.
China in contrast, appears resolved to a neorealist state in its relations with other nations by subtly balancing its power with the United States through the country’s economic and domestic agenda in the Americas via soft power. With respect to internal interest balancing, China is gradually growing its capabilities by increasing its economic growth internationally while balancing its interest externally against the world’s sole super power by increasing its military spending.
Despite the perceived interest balancing, China’s contemporary foreign policy has been shaped by its workings from within the established international system which has proposed a conciliatory foreign policy aimed at being seen as a partner rather than as a new imperial power.
Relations between Brazil, the United States and China
Brazil is a significant political and economic power in Latin America and an emerging power in the world stage according to Brazil’s Country Profile, United Kingdom Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (2009). Cronin (2009) states further that “Brazil is actively advancing diplomatic and economic initiatives that are redesigning relations with South American neighbors and creating new strategic partners outside of the region.” “Brazil’s foreign policy reflects its pursuit towards becoming a regional and potential world power and is designed to help protect the country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic propriety”

(Wikipedia, 2010).

Brazil’s foreign policy has generally been based on principles of

multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement and non-intervention in the affairs of other countries”
(Landau, 2003). “Of late, Brazilian foreign policy has aimed to strengthen ties with other South
American countries, engage in multilateral diplomacy through the United Nations and the
Organization of American States.” Additionally, “Brazil has acted as a countervailing force to the
United States’ political and economic influence in Latin American” (Wikipedia, 2010).
According to Cronin (2009), historically, relations between the United States and Brazil have been intense and complex in the areas of trade, investment, science and technology. Yet in the past decade, Brazil’s leaders have diversified the country’s ties with Asia, the European Union, and its immediate neighbors’ markets, all of which have helped the country to weather economic adjustments and constraints emanating from Washington. Despite this, “Brazil-United States relations have a long history, characterized by moments of remarkable convergence of interest but also sporadic and critical divergences on sensitive international issues. The United States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power, especially in its role as a stabilizing force and skillful interlocutor in Latin America. As a significant political and economic power; Brazil has traditionally preferred to cooperate with the United States on specific issues rather than seeking to develop an all-encompassing, privileged relationship with the United States” (Wikipedia, 2010).
Nevertheless, “the United States and Brazil share congruent interests: At the strategic level, both countries desire stability in Latin America and the larger international arena. Likewise, they both believe in the benefits of a liberal economic order, even if they differ on what exactly that order should resemble; they also have democratic political systems and both would be threatened should authoritarian states in Europe or Asia seek to eliminate the international order.
Similarly, both have a vested interest in Latin America in containing authoritarian populism and seeing that President Chavez does not emerge as the preeminent regional statesman” (Brands,
2010). In fact, Cronin (2009) states that “in the coming years, the United States will have to decide what kind of relationship it wants with Brazil; it can either engage Brazil to forge a partnership that can promote mutual security interests with consultation and collaboration, or it can continue its current course as a passive observer of Brazil’s expanding role as a protagonist in global politics and emerging leader on the South American international scene.”
Contrastingly, “Brazil-China relations which was formally established in 1974 have since strengthened where China is now Brazil’s largest trading partner and source of space technology”
(Telegraphy Company of United Kingdom, 2009).

There has also been a major surge in

investment by China in Brazil such as: $50 billion mega port project; $5 billion steel mill; vehicle and other factories; $1.7 billion power facilities and a $9 billion train project” among others. More importantly, China represents a vital trading partner and source of technology acquisition that is critical to Brazil’s grand strategy of becoming a regional and global power.
The dynamics of the international relations exhibited reflects differing ideologies and national interests. For example, Brazil’s form of liberalism is dictated by its grand strategy to become a regional and global power. “Guided by geopolitical motives rather than ideological ones,
Brazil wants a peaceful, integrated South America to become a serious global player. Brazil is the hub with the fifth largest economy in the world, an investment-grade rating, major energy finds, and broad-based partnerships with African countries, India, and China. It has long been a country without enemies. Brazil benefits from a friendly and increasingly interconnected continent with a developing political and economic identity as a country not subordinate to the United States.
Venezuela, in contrast, is motivated more by ideological interests and leverages its surging oil revenue to legitimize and export its socialist strategy along with its financial support for leftist politicians and political parties in many countries” (Cronin, 2009).
As stated by Cronin (2009) however, “Brazil is aiming for what one scholar calls
‘consensual hegemony’. Brazilian officials seek to portray their country’s diplomacy as a benign, unthreatening project so as to avoid reviving traditional fears of a hegemonic Brazil and thereby driving South American countries toward Caracas or Washington…Accordingly, for Brazil to achieve effective regional leadership, it will have to forge consensual arrangements that provide its neighbors with economic and political benefits while drawing them deeper into the Brazilian orbit.” Relations between Venezuela, the United States and China
“The foreign relations of Venezuela have, since the early twentieth century been particularly strong with the United States.” However, “with the election of Hugo Chavez as
President of Venezuela in 1998, the foreign policy of Hugo Chavez government has differed substantially from that of previous Venezuelan governments” (Wikipedia, 2010). Venezuela’s relationship with Cuba conflicts with United States’ isolation policy and Chavez has been intensely critical of the United States’ foreign policies. For instance, the United States’ invasion of Iraq,
Haiti, Kosovo and the Free Trade Area of the Americas; consolidated diplomatic relations with
Iran including defending its right to civilian nuclear power. Moreover, Venezuela opposes the

current world order and pursues a non-aligned movement of populism throughout Latin America using its natural resources as soft power (CCN, 2006).
However, China’s relations with Venezuela have been increasing particularly since Chavez became President. As noted by Venezuelanalysis.com (2010), “Sino-Venezuelan trade was less than $500 million per year before 1999, and has now reached $7.5 billion in 2009 making China
Venezuela’s second largest trading partner and Venezuela China’s biggest investment destination in Latin America.

Various bilateral deals have seen China invest billions in Venezuela, and

Venezuela increase export of oil and other resources to China.”
The hostile relations exhibited between Venezuela and the United States is consistent with contrasting ideologies being meshed with high levels of mistrust and indicative of the divide between liberal and realist actors as noted by Walt (1998). According to Walt (1998), ‘realist states are self-interested and compete constantly for power or security.”

This assertion is

reinforced by Measheimer (2001) who stated that “in an anarchic environment, survival is the primary goal of great powers because states can never be certain about the other’s intentions.”
Demonstration of this fact exemplifies Venezuela’s posture and to a lesser degree China despite its peaceful development approaches in its relations with the United States and the Americas.
Whereas, liberal states’ concern for power is overridden by economic and political considerations; the confrontational stance adopted by the United States reflect the democratic peace theory where democracies are deemed more peaceful than autocratic states, yet poised to confront such states
(realist) to settle disputes.
China’s Foreign Policy in the Caribbean and Latin America
According to Xinhau (2008), “the Chinese Government views its relations with the
Americas from a strategic plane as Latin America and Caribbean countries are an important part of the developing world and a major force in the international arena.”

China’s foreign policy

assertion is reinforced by Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (2010), which defines the foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China as having “officially state its unswervingly pursuit of an independent foreign policy of peace or peaceful development. The fundamental goals of its policy are to pursue China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up; modernization, construction and maintenance of world peace while propelling common development.”
However, “recent Chinese foreign policy makers may be seen to adhere to the realist rather

than the liberal school of international relations theory.” Thus, according to Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia (2010), “in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union and the United States; China has not advanced any higher international ideological interests such as world communism or world democracy since the Cold War; that is, ideology seems to be secondary to advancing the country’s national interests.” Furthermore, the country “does not maintain diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes Taiwan and seeks a higher profile in the United Nations through its permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council and other multilateral organizations. It has improved ties with Russia in large part to serve as a counter-balance to the United States by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 2001” (Wikipedia, 2010). Ellis (2010) notes that “PRC policymakers have emphasized the ‘peaceful’ nature of China’s rise and have generally avoided military or political actions which could be seen by the U.S. as “threatening.”
Nonetheless, the economic, institutional, and cultural battles through which the PRC has advanced its position have both leveraged, and contributed to an erosion of the US strategic position globally.”
United States Posture to China’s Growing Influence in the Americas
Dr. Frank Mora, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Western Hemisphere stated during a conference on the “Strategic Implications of China’s Evolving Relationship with
Latin America” held at the Center of Hemispheric Defence Studies that “although the PRC may compete with the U.S. in certain areas, the US government does not view its activities in Latin
America as inherently a threat.” He noted that “Chinese trade and investment in the region, under some circumstances, may support US policy objectives thereby contributing to economic opportunity, thus lessening poverty and promoting economic diversity by trade with China; additionally, those supported by Chinese investment, may better connect remote areas, promote development and an expanded state presence, thus helping indirectly to address the challenges of
‘under-ungoverned’ and ungoverned spaces’ in the region (Conference Summary & Proceedings,
2009).

Dr Mora also acknowledged that “with greater transparency, and under the right

circumstances, PRC military aid to the region, including certain arms sales, need not necessarily be viewed negatively by the U.S., allowing states of the region to more effectively manage their territory and combat threats such as narcotics, arms and human trafficking” (Conference Summary
& Proceedings, 2009).
Dr. Mora also asserted that “in terms of the Chinese impact on economic opportunity in

the hemisphere, the U.S. position applies to the Americas as it applies across the world.” “We seek a global economy that promotes and facilitates sustained growth and greater socio-economic inclusion.” As President Obama has said, “we have a moral and pragmatic interest’ in questions of development. We therefore welcome China’s economic engagement in the region as a natural by-product of the global economy in the hope that it fosters greater socio-economic equality and further contributes to the sustained and increasingly equitable growth already under way in countries such as Brazil and Chile. Diversified economies help lead to dynamic growth and increased stability. Greater socio-economic equality and mobility also strips away much of the initial motivation for those who enter into the world of illicit trafficking: poverty” (Conference
Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
China’s foreign policy in the region was examined further by three leading scholars during the same conference held at the Center of Hemispheric Defence Studies. While each of the speakers interpreted the overall pattern of China’s engagement with Latin America differently, they generally agreed that Chinese engagement with Latin America extends beyond trade and investment, to interest in military, technological, political, and socio-cultural cooperation
(Conference Summary and Proceedings, 2009).
Dr. Jiang Shixue, Deputy Director of the Institute of European Studies at the China
Academy of Social Sciences noted that “China not only has become a significant trade partner for many countries of the region, but also has used its bilateral relationships with individual Latin
American countries to forge agreements and promote initiatives that expand this trade”
(Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009). Dr. Shixue stated further that “China’s White Paper on Latin America identified 35 areas of cooperation that China is interested in pursuing with countries of the region grouped into five categories: (1) political, (2) economic, (3) cultural and social, (4) peace and security and judicial affairs, and (5) relations with Latin America and
Caribbean regional organizations” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
Dr. Shixue also stressed that the “PRC’s military relationships in the region should be understood in the context of the 150 military partnerships that the PRC maintains worldwide, including exchanges of high-level delegations, bilateral or multi-lateral military exercises and educational programs among other activities.” “China-Latin America military cooperation, he added, should not be a concern to the U.S., insofar as that the relations are guided by the principles of not targeting any third party, and not doing anything to harm the regional or hemispheric stability.” He further argued that “the U.S. remains the priority relationship for China

in the region, and thus concluded that the U.S. should not feel threatened by China’s military or other relationships with Latin American states” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
However, Dr. William Ratliff, Research Fellow and Curator at The Hoover Institution of
Stanford University, “focused his remarks on the context of China’s relationship with Latin
America, and its impact on the region, as well as U.S. concerns regarding the relationship.” He argued that “the way in which China, Latin America and the United States respond to current developments is complicated by each civilization’s view of its own superiority, and its own way of viewing itself as victim” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
DR. Ratliff asserted further during the proceedings that “China’s relationship with Latin
America coincides with and contributes to (but has not caused), the latest surge of anti-Americanism in Latin America.

United States’ prestige in Latin America has declined

significantly in recent years, and as a whole the region has grown more independent from
Washington. While there are several reasons for this trend, one driver has been Latin America’s frustration that the United States has ignored the region in its foreign relations, and has not shown sufficient respect for the Latin American viewpoint in formulating its policy toward its neighbors.
In the context of Latin America’s history of interactions with the U.S., China’s combination of attention to the region and neutrality on the internal policies of its governments has been a welcome change” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
Ratliff (2009), also noted that “despite the economic benefits accruing from Chinese trade and investment, analyst worry that the PRC will have a detrimental effect on the development of democracy and the respect for human and civil rights in Latin America, since China serves as a symbol that a country can grow rapidly in economic terms without democratization and human rights.” Dr. Ratliff argued further that “the greatest potential concern for United States

policymakers comes from China’s foreign policy approach to the region. While he noted that
Beijing does prefer countries which are politically stable and reliable with respect to honoring contracts and not ‘changing the rules’ for investors; he noted as problematic China’s willingness to court anti-U.S. regimes in resource rich countries” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
Dr. Daniel Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. Policy and Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-American Dialogue differed from his colleagues in highlighting some of the potentially negative economic impacts that China’s relationship with the region can also generate. Dr.
Erikson stated during the conference that “the United States also has some valid causes for concern, particularly with respect to China’s relationship with anti-U.S. regimes in the region such

as that of Venezuela.” Moreover, he noted “the focus on Central America and the Caribbean as one of the last battlegrounds in the struggle between the PRC and the Republic of China (Taiwan) over diplomatic recognition” (Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).

Dr. Erikson also

indicated that “despite the volume of China’s trade with Latin America and the corresponding rate of increase over the past decade; the relationship has not been purely beneficial for Latin America”
(Conference Summary & Proceedings, 2009).
China’s Potential Rise or Fall
Despite China’s foreign policy of “peaceful development’ and its pragmatic approach of forming strategic partnerships worldwide and in the Americas particularly; the country’s ambition of forming a secure international environment conducive to its reform in the writer’s view will not occur unchallenged.

Along the potential continuum stated earlier, a sequence of events or

potentialities are likely to happen which may interfere with China’s international and domestic agendas. Its focus on a readily accessible supply of raw materials and energy sources; commercial opportunities presented by the regimes markets; and diplomatic and political leverages that the
Americas can provide; leaves no assurance that current international relations and the security environment will remain stable or conditions in the Asian-Pacific region remain calm and not deter its rise by diverting resources toward conflicts.
Given China’s relations with many unstable populist regimes in the region, the world’s recovery from the current global recession will undoubtedly reveal the region’s true intent of forging long-term and mutually beneficial relations with China. Moreover, this coupled with social issues alone in China and hostile intra-state relations currently brewing in Korea, can all potentially detract from or hamper China’s rise as a regional and global superpower and hegemony. Therefore, several probabilities are offered by the writer:
1.

The People’s Republic of China will likely succeed in its peaceful development foreign policy if hostile intra and inter-state relations in the Asian-Pacific subside and the country’s resolves current social issues at home.

2.

The People’s Republic of China will likely face hostile relations and possible conflict globally from other major powers as competition becomes fierce for scarce energy sources especially if countries seek to protect critical sea lanes to ensure access and sustainable quantities of supplies. (Figure and Table 1 provides the impetus for this occurrence).

3.

The People’s Republic of China may collapse, thus failing to realize the true economic growth possible given the instability and unresolved issue in the Asian-Pacific region along with the major social issues and inequalities internally.
The foundations for these probability-based scenarios or events considers historical

behavior by the actors involved; the chances of differing ideologies blending sufficiently regardless of whatever strategic partnerships are formed; and historical accounts of confrontations over protection of sustainable supplies of energy resources as experienced in the Middle East. Above all, the ever present security dilemma and mistrust between the various actors and tendencies towards the use of hard power to resolve differences are also factored.
Figure 1: Map Country Populations 2010

Map Country Populations 2010: Source – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world_population
Table 1: Percentage of World Population Distribution
RANK

COUNTRY

POPULATION

% of World Pop.

1

China (PRC)

1,341,240,000

19.5

2

India

1,191,600,000

17.3

3

United States

310,931,000

4.51

4

Indonesia

238,400,000

3.4

5

Brazil

193,945,000

2.82

These perspectives are supported by the Development Concepts and Doctrine Center
(DCDC) Global Strategic Trend Analysis 2007-2036 issue which states that “we believe that the

future will happen as a result of long-term themes and developments that unite the past, the present and the future.” However, the writer’s probability assessment criterion is adopted from the DCDC [United Kingdom] Strategic Trends Programme, Global Strategic Trends Outlook to
2040 analysis of current and likely trends.
ASSESSMENT OF
PROBABILITY
Description

Associated Probability
Range

Will
Likely/Probably
May/Possibly
Unlikely/Improbable

Greater than 90%
Between 60% and 90%
Between 10% and 60%
Less than 10%
(Adopted from DCDC Outlook to 2040)

Moreover, the writer’s assertions are supported by McMillan, Rumer, and Saunders (2009), via their overview of China’s quest and likely implications/consequences. According to McMillan et al. (2009), “as China continues to reassert its great power status, the challenge for U.S. diplomacy is likely to be far more complicated than Cold War–style containment or straightforward great power competition for resources, access, and influence. The complicating factor here is that
China’s future growth and social cohesion are not to be taken for granted. A China that stumbles in its pursuit of economic and political modernization would be fraught with numerous negative consequences, both economic and strategic, for the United States” (McMillan et al., 2009).
McMillan et al. (2009) stated further:
Chinese leaders are focused on the domestic tasks of maintaining social stability and preventing challenges to Communist Party rule. Economic growth is viewed as a critical means of building legitimacy and maintaining stability. But the economic reforms that have promoted growth and raised living standards have also created serious social problems such as unemployment, an inadequate social safety net, and a collapsing rural healthcare system. One measure of these problems is the increasing number of protests in China.

Protests generally have local causes, but they also reflect underlying systemic problems. One major issue is the declining legitimacy of the Chinese Communist
Party, due to problems such as economic inequality resulting from reforms that benefit some individuals and regions more than others. Protests to date have remained isolated and have not presented a major threat to the regime. However,
Chinese leaders are worried about the revolutions that toppled governments in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The immediate response has been a crackdown on press freedom and intensified controls on nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and the Internet.
The more important question is whether China can continue rapid growth without significant political reforms. Party goals of building a “harmonious society” cannot compensate for the lack of effective political institutions to represent diverse and competing social interests. But Chinese leaders appear determined to prevent the emergence of any organized political groups and to resist any independent monitoring of government officials by the press or the public. Instead, the party seeks to rely on intraparty supervision and anticorruption campaigns that are unlikely to be effective. Technocratic approaches and scientific management are unlikely to solve the serious social problems China faces. The party maintains considerable coercive tools, but an economic slowdown would greatly increase the challenge of maintaining social stability.
Instability in China would pose a variety of challenges for the United States.
Chinese leaders would likely respond to widespread instability with a political crackdown, possibly involving the use of force, to maintain order. This would raise the profile of human rights issues in U.S. China policy and heighten concerns that
China was moving toward greater authoritarianism rather than democracy (Table 2:
Freedom Status). Chinese leaders would likely also seek to accelerate economic growth via increased exports to ameliorate underlying social problems. This might lead to increased government subsidies or incentives for exporters, further aggravating U.S. concerns about China’s trade practices and undervalued currency.

Table 2: World Freedom Status
Country

Political Rights

Civil Liberties

Freedom Status

Belarus

7

6

Not Free

Chad

7

6

Not Free

China

7

6

Not Free

Cuba

7

6

Not Free

Guinea

7

6

Not Free

Laos

7

6

Not Free

Saudi Arabia

7

6

Not Free

Syria

7

6

Not Free

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=549&year=2010
China is 1 of 49 countries considered not free (freedom status); 1 of 8 with a 6.5 rating (7 being least free) and 1 of 18 with a 6.5 rating and higher. [General state of freedom in a country or territory].
China continues to demonstrate high levels of insecurity and intolerance regarding citizen’s political activism and demands for human rights. The country has experienced lockdowns on major cities and restrictions on the internet and the communist government continues its campaign against democratic activists, human rights lawyers and religious or ethnic minorities.

Moreover, the Development Concepts and Doctrine Center also made several probability assessments in its 2040 outlook reflecting underlying issues with the potential of supporting or deterring China’s success:
The hegemonic dominance of the US will fade. She is likely to remain the pre-eminent military power, although, in political, economic and military terms, she is likely to be increasingly constrained as others grow in influence and confidence.
However, the rise of individual states, such as China, should not be considered a certainty given the nature and magnitude of the challenges they face, nor should their eventual influence be over-estimated. Instead there will be several states and institutions competing for regional and global influence, cooperating and competing within the international community.
The incidence of armed conflict is likely to increase underpinned by: an unstable transition to a multi-polar world that allows old and new state rivalries to emerge; widespread global inequality that heightens associated grievances; population

increases, resource scarcity and the adverse effects of climate change that combine to increase instability; and the increased importance of ideology. The risks of inter-state war may increase beyond 2020 when intensifying competition for resources, particularly energy and possibly food, and continued population growth result in heightened tension.
Any assumption that Western liberal values and processes would become the global norm has already been severely challenged. Out to 2040, there will be an era of competing political systems, ranging from liberal democracy through to autocracy and theocracy. Tension between regions, states and nationalist identities, and corruption among ruling elites, are likely to constrain the spread of democracy.
Liberal democracies will still dominate in the West. However, the arguments of some democratic movements may not be perceived as strong enough to solve the problems in some developing states that maintain, or turn to, more autocratic or authoritarian political systems. The populations of some states may favour stability, the promise of economic growth and limited de-regulation at the expense of fully representative government. Political systems based on tradition, be it ethnic, tribal or religious, are likely to remain features of the global political system, as are dictatorships. Continuing further, DCDC 2040 outlook projects that “China’s growth depends on access to raw materials at competitive prices, a continuing appetite in the developed and developing world for its exports and security of the international system. In future, it may seek to exert economic muscle or other hard power to protect growth and internal stability. Any non-consensual change to Taiwan’s status is likely, with little warning, to destabilize rapidly China’s relations with the international community, in particular the US. Continued economic growth may also create further regional rivalry and competition with an increasingly confident and vigorous India. Once
China has established itself as a major world power, possibly as early as 2025, it may feel less constrained in its behaviour, presenting greater challenges to an international system.”
However, the impetus for these possible events as inferred by DCDC 2040 outlook states that:

More so than other major powers, China’s future path has a wide range of possibilities, ranging from the emergence of a fully democratic China through to the fragmentation, or even collapse, of the state. All are unlikely, but none can be completely dismissed. China’s future will ultimately be defined by whether, and how, she manages to create a system of politics that can sustain social cohesion alongside rising prosperity.

China’s rise is not guaranteed and internal

contradictions are likely to disrupt development, lead to challenges to the authority of the state and affect her external policies and interaction. Internal inequalities between a relatively prosperous, urbanized littoral region and an under-developed rural hinterland, and the lack of transparent and accountable governance, are likely to periodically create internal tensions that may spill over into organized disorder and political violence. Alternatively, rapidly expanding urban areas may produce a diversity of political movements campaigning for greater political and social freedoms. Similarly, environmental degradation, social unrest, demographic ageing, gender imbalances, water supply difficulties caused by fluctuations in Himalayan glacial melt, and agricultural degradation may all disrupt China’s rise, although civil war, complete state breakdown or reversion to the inward-looking policies of the Maoist era are all unlikely. Separatist movements, especially in remote ethnically or culturally distinct regions, will proliferate, often conducting irregular and terrorist campaigns as they grow in confidence and capability.
These factors, together with changing patterns of land use, the failure to deliver per capita prosperity and environmental stresses caused by climate change and pollution, could reduce China’s traditional resilience to natural disaster. A future large-scale disaster might therefore cause China’s progress towards strategic power status to stall and might even result in it becoming a failed state, prone to civil conflict and separatism.
Considering the dynamics involved in China’s quest in its foreign policy and relations formed with Brazil and Venezuela, and subsequent implications for the United States; our case

studies analyzes the impact on the state actors along China’s continuum beginning with its likelihood of economic success given sustainable access to energy sources, possibility of facing extreme challenges due to competition for scarce energy resources or possible collapse due to internal social problems.
Case Study: Brazil
The essence of Brazil’s relations or strategic partnership with China and members of BRIC and IBSA focuses on its national interest of becoming a major power and influence of world politics and dynamics as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In fact, according to Cronin (2009), “potential benefits of a closer relationship with China could eventually serve as the core of an extremely powerful southern diplomatic or economic bloc.” In addition,
“there is also a growing degree of technological and military cooperation between the two countries which complements the deals established with Russia and France” (Cronin, 2009).
China’s successful economic agenda for Brazil, translates into a win-win scenario for both countries where Brazil could potentially realize it’s regional and international agenda (Grand
Strategy) stated earlier. DCDC third edition 2007-2036 projections reaffirm this possibility by asserting that “if integration is successful, it is likely to result in significant external investment, especially from China, and increasing opportunities for stability and prosperity.” The basis of the writer’s postulation is that economic growth is directly correlated with lowering poverty rates generally, albeit there are cases where the wealth is unequally distributed amongst the population.
Hence, Brazil would likely avoid the negative dilemmas facing her that has the potential to retard internal economic growth and social cohesion. The dilemmas according to Brands (2010) include: poor infrastructure, rampant crime and excessive taxation and economy regulation, in addition to reconciling the relationship with neighbors in South America by sharing its economic and political success. However, given competition for scarce resources and if China stumbles in her quest economically; Brazil will likely be hard-pressed to leverage its relations further with the remaining members of BRIC and IBSA to realize its political agenda as an emerging world power. In other words, the fundamental goal of Brazil’s grand strategy to hasten its transition from the dominance of the developed world to a multipolar order whereby international power balances and institutions become more favorable to Brazil’s interest would be hampered significantly. This hypothesis is based on the void China would create for Brazil considering the increasing trading relations

between them and the major surge in foreign direct investment by China in Brazil mounting to billions of dollars.
The situation would become even direr if China fails in its bid for continued economic growth or possibly collapses altogether given internal challenges. As a matter of fact, there would likely be global implications if this scenario occurs given that economic prosperity and diversity permits states to effectively manage their territories and control threats like narcotics, arms and human smuggling. Moreover, the fragility of the alternative forums of global influence (BRIC and
IBSA) would probably crumble considering that each country has its own divergent interests.
Moreover, Brazil’s global and regional goals of strengthening norms and organizations to check
American power and establishing itself as the recognized leader of a united South American bloc would also likely fail.
Case Study: Venezuela
As stated by Ellis (2010), “at its core; trade, investment and technical support from China help the Chavez regime to preserve its economic and political viability as it pursues a strategy in the region that defies U.S. and western economic institutions.” “The contribution of China to the viability of the Chavez regime has five elements: 1) it is a source of short-term funds, 2) it helps
Venezuela extract its commodities, 3) it diversifies Venezuela’s export markets, 4) it generates symbolic projects for domestic consumption, and 5) it serves as an alternative supplier of second-tier military goods.”
Therefore, in order for Venezuela’s economy to survive given the magnitude of direct foreign investment and its increasing reliance on Chinese companies to extract its energy sources and other commodities; China must succeed with its economic agenda. Fortunately, if it does; the
United States becomes the victim of continual antagonism from Venezuela possibly as long as
Chavez’s government remains in power or the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, a successful China and a deepening Venezuela-China relationship as noted by Ellis (2010), “creates implications for the country, for the region and for the United States that are significant regardless of the intentions imputed by China.”
An example of an implication created thus far is the potential spread of the populist ideology by Venezuela’s across Latin America.

This, coupled with Venezuela’s ability and

continual use of soft power to create binding relations with neighboring countries by virtue of
China’s economic success, strengthens a regional bloc likely to exclude the United States from its

affairs.
However, if China faces stiff competition for scarce resources (energy sources) it will likely benefit Venezuela as market forces (supply and demand) would raise its bargaining power with
China. In fact, regimes like Venezuela however unstable are poised to benefit enormously unless they are able to manage their “unsustainable cycle of spending and mismanagement” as noted by
Ellis (2010). Additionally, it is likely that Venezuela could possibly renege on its contractual obligations given this scenario, thus accommodating the highest bidder or worst, in China’s view, seek to nationalize infrastructural developments [investments] made. Yet, although possible, it is unlikely that Venezuela would pursue this avenue unless another sustainable partnership develops or China completely collapses.
Contrastingly, the worst possible scenario for Venezuela occurs if China collapses under the weight of its internal affairs or drawn into intra or inter-state conflicts in the Asian-Pacific region. Considering that China’s relations with Venezuela and Venezuela’s independence on

China’s source of cash inflow; it is quite possible that Venezuela economy succumbs also unless neighboring countries like Bolivia and Ecuador rescues it. As indicated by Ellis (2010), ownership of the supply and logistic chain is controlled by China” which in the writer’s view unfortunately places Venezuela in a dire position. For example, China is considered by Ellis (2010) to be a source of short-term funds; helps extract Venezuela’s commodities; diversifies Venezuela’s export markets and serves as an alternative supplier of second-tier military goods, all of which makes the country too dependent on China for its survival. In sum, Venezuela’s economic foundation would have to be rebuilt unless she reverses course in the country’s relations with the United States as a strategic trading partner or exerts greater influence via soft power in the Americas.
Implications for the United States
The implications facing the United States given the possible continuum of events and its possible response can be contemplated by analyzing the likely dynamics of the Americas generally.
As stated by Ellis (2010):
The maneuvering between external actors in Latin America is likely to play itself out as a two-level game: At one extreme, Iran, China, and occasionally Russia and India, will increasingly collaborate with Brazil, as an emerging regional power, as well as populist regimes such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, to pursue independent,

but

complimentary anti-establish quo

alliances

and activities, ultimately

undercutting the position of the US, and to a lesser extent, the EU. Such policies and ongoing political change in Latin America will continue to shake up the status quo and create new opportunities for these “outside” states to position themselves in Latin American markets, and gain an investment foothold in Latin American commodity sectors.
At the same time, an ever more intense competition will emerge for what is truly important: Latin America’s commodities and markets. This competition will primarily be fought out between China, which holds the overall advantage, and
India, but will also involve Russia in military sectors, and Russia and Iran with respect to energy. Both Chinese and Indian companies will likely position themselves as “Third World” to win markets, particularly with Brazil and the populist regimes, yet each will struggle to define its “south-south” relationship with
Latin America in a way that gives it strategic advantage vice its commercial rival.
With more conservative regimes, for example, India may position itself as more democratic and “western,” to win points against China.
The limitations of each external actor in Latin America will also shape the dynamics of their interaction. Both China and India are highly sensitive to aligning themselves too closely with the anti-western political projects of populist regimes such as those currently in Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia. For Russia and Iran, by contrast, association with the more anti-US rhetoric of populist regimes in Latin
America serves both domestic and foreign policy objectives, although the Russian posture is more complicated, seeking to associate itself with the community of
“responsible, developed” European nations, even while participating in an alliance of developing nations unified by anti-US themes. It is likely that Iran, and occasionally Russia, will join the most vehement anti-US actions in the region, while China and India will principally attempt to remain “free riders,” taking advantage of the spaces opened up by these actors for doing business.

Therefore, the most favourable scenario facing the United States in the writer’s view occurs if (1) China succeeds despite the level of support leveraged to Brazil and Venezuela as long as the emerging power [China] behaves as a responsible stakeholder thus seeking to help alleviate poverty, stabilize economies and contribute positively to the global economy. In contrast, the second and third possibilities considered on the continuum; that is, hostilities and potential conflict due to scarce energy sources or the collapse of China’s economy due to internal misgivings occurs would have lasting unfavorable global effects as alluded to earlier. Nevertheless, if the final two events were to happen; the rebuilding process would definitely serve as an opportunity for the
United States to develop mutually beneficial relationships with the Americas and other anti-American regimes worldwide.
Recommendations
The relationships formed by the United States should resemble actions indicated by DCDC third edition 2007-2036, which posit that “The US will remain a politically stable major power; however, her response to the decline of her hegemony will be a critical factor for global stability.
She is likely to respond positively to impending challenges by renewing alliances and partnerships as well as forming collaborative relationships with emerging and rising powers, carefully calibrating her military responses, and concentrating on soft power to achieve her objectives.” Specifically, and as stated by Cronin (2009), “the framework of a new U.S. strategic approach to the Americas should be built on a foundation of three values: respect for the views and sensitivities of other states; a willingness to work with states either individually or as communities in reciprocal ways; and a careful focus on nurturing trust. The structure itself should comprise ways to go about cooperating with Latin American and Caribbean countries or sub-regional groups.”
Conclusion
In concluding, China’s rise in the global economy should be carefully monitored by the
United States despite the current benefits being realized by many countries due to the economic recession. Irrespective of China’s foreign policy statements of promoting mutual respect, mutual trust and expanding common ground; deepening cooperation and achieving win-win results; while drawing on each other’s strengths to boost common progress and intensifying exchanges; the writer does not believe that China’s aspiration is not focused on becoming a hegemony; nor play power

politics or interfere with other countries’ internal affairs nor impose its own ideology on other countries. This perception is reinforced by the lopsided [trading] relationships or trade imbalances being formed with smaller states of the Americas, particularly Latin America and the enormous amount of investment made which subconsciously binds recipient countries.

Moreover, the

relations formed seeks to subvert the market forces [capitalist mechanism] in securing the provision of energy sources by locking in future supplies via strategic capital [infrastructural] developments to satisfy its long-term economic success and projected demographic growth rates
(Figure 2, Table 3).
Furthermore, the timing of China’s aggressive foreign policy which started following the onset of the current economic recession creates perceptions of unfair negotiations with states in dire need of foreign direct investments to stimulate declining economies. While there is nothing wrong with investing strategically and contributing positively to declining economies; however, the writer’s concerns stem from the long-term implications of such decisions. The question that deserves answering is whether these countries would have made the same decisions with China had the recession never occurred? Probably not; this is exemplified by several states who have not ceded to China’s soft power (investment opportunities, future access to China’s markets, inflow of
Chinese tourists, etc) nor renege on the legitimacy of Republic of China (Taiwan).
Additionally, China’s pledge of not resorting to force or threat of force, in resolving international disputes cannot be taken wholeheartedly as past experiences and tendencies quite often predict one’s future response. Hence, by nature, China’s historical familiarity with wars in resolving conflicts makes it extremely difficult to accept the communist state’s assertion or true intent in its pragmatic peaceful rise. For example, the 1950-53 Korean War waged by China and its
North Korean ally against the United States, South Korea and the United Nations; its border war in 1962 against India; and its earlier motive in the 1070s and 1980s to seek the West assistance with its then modernization drive in countering Soviet expansionism which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and world peace.
While the country may be genuine in its intentions; countries like the United States must definitely be wary of China’s true underlying agenda and not sit idly as the emerging superpower deceptively spreads it sphere of influence virtually over the remaining battle grounds for supplies of critical energy sources; diplomatic and political leverage within Latin America and capital markets while devaluing its currency in creating unfair trade advantages.

Figure 2: Regional Population Growth Projections

United Nations 2008 estimates and medium variant projections (in millions)
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world_population
Year

World

Asia

Africa

Europe

Latin
America

Northern
America

Oceania

2010

6,909

4,167 (60.3%)

1,033 (15%)

733 (10.6%)

589 (8.5%)

352 (5.1%)

36 (0.5%)

2020

7,675

4,596 (59.9%)

1,276 (16.6%)

733 (9.6%)

646 (8.4%)

383 (5%)

40 (0.5%)

2030

8,309

4,917 (59.2%)

1,524 (18.3%)

723 (8.7%)

690 (8.3%)

410 (4.9%)

45 (0.5%)

2040

8,801

5,125 (58.2%)

1,770 (20.1%)

708 (8%)

718 (8.2%)

431 (4.9%)

48 (0.5%)

691 (7.6%)

729 (8%)

448 (4.9%)

51 (0.6%)

2050
9,150
5,231 (57.2%) 1,998 (21.8%)
Table 3: Regional Population Growth Projections

Finally, the writer wishes to acknowledge the statements of Cronin (2009), as a means of encouraging the United States to proactively monitor and respond to China’s rise by developing meaningful relations built on shared values and with those of opposing ideologies in her response to the current global trend. Cronin (2009) states that:
While the United States has lost influence in the Western Hemisphere and
Washington’s leadership is being challenged; Latin America and the Caribbean do not present a completely negative setting for U.S. security and prosperity. On the contrary, many countries have made considerable headway invigorating economic growth, diminishing poverty and inequality, empowering people, deepening

democratic roots, and playing responsible roles on the international stage. The fact that Brazil and Mexico are emerging global players does not challenge Washington, nor does Hugo Chavez’s brand of radical populism, which most Latin American states have not adopted. In many ways the region presents a positive strategic environment. The issue the United States must address concerns its willingness to adapt to the region-wide sea change taking place in the Americas in order to advance its agenda.

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