The Question of Objectivity in Husserl and Heidegger
This paper discusses the question of objectivity in Husserl and Heidegger and their respective views. Husserl addresses the question of objectivity by means of investigating the consciousness, where as Heidegger emphasizes knowing reality means knowing being. The view of each philosopher as well as arguments and counterarguments with respective examples are examined.
In order to understand objectivity, Husserl asserts that the answer is found in perception and consciousness. Through investigation of our mind we can know reality. In order to understand reality one must understand phenomenology and phenomenological reduction. Phenomenology is a category of Contemporary Continental Philosophy that rejects the practical Kantian notion that the thing itself cannot be known. Husserl, unlike Kant, believes that the phenomena do reveal things themselves. He believes that by going “back to things themselves,” one can grasp an aspect of a thing’s true essence, and accordingly objective reality. Phenomenology embraces realism, which is the revelation of the existence of an objective reality outside or apart of one’s mind. In principle, Husserl supposes that the world is objectively real and that it is not a creation or illusion in one’s own mind. Thus, Husserl argues that things can be known through the phenomena; the manifestation of things themselves.
To counter this argument, Kant may suggest that you cannot know things themselves, and we have no empirical access to objectivity. He would say one can know the world of appearance by accessing it through one’s senses. However, we have no way of getting into contact with reality because our consciousness distorts reality. For example, Husserl would argue when looking at a flower, the thing in itself can be known by investigating our consciousness. The true essence or objectivity of the flower is in fact attainable. On the other hand, Kant would assert that though we can ascertain certain characteristics of the flower by using our five senses, we cannot be sure that it is a flower or that it exists. We have no way of knowing reality. Husserl would go on to say that this idea is simply incorrect. Through phenomenological reduction we can know the essence of the things themselves and know reality.
Husserl goes on to claim phenomenology’s critique of science, embraced by the Catholic Church, is the belief that things we know in our consciousness already exist in our mind. It is through our natural attitude we see the world. By considering the world around us independent of our mind, we are able to recognize objectivity. Phenomenological reduction is the suspension or bracketing of the natural attitude. When bracketing the natural attitude we do not reject the thing it is or the objectivity of the thing but rather we try to understand more completely the thing itself, reality, and how perception works. For example, when we see a flower, we bracket the natural attitude or simply consider the world around us independent from our minds. By doing so we can come into contact the true objective essence of the flower, and know for sure that it is real. Husserl stresses the importance of going back to consciousness in order to better understand and grasp objective reality. Thus, Husserl argues that through phenomenological reduction we investigate our consciousness to better understand the phenomena and the world around us as existent apart from our mind.
Husserl continues his argument by discussing anticipation. Anticipation is a structure of one’s intentional consciousness as a moment of synthesis. It is a feature of one’s conscious to perceive objects and recognize them as being real. For example when we look at a book that sits upon a table, we anticipate that the book has a front and back cover, though we may not be able to see it. Anticipation is not a subjective production but rather an objective production of what the object truly is. It does not add value to the object. Through intuitive capacity, anticipation, and experience one can grasp the essence and objective reality of a thing.
Husserl furthers his argument by discussing another aspect of our consciousness and how it can bring us in contact with objectivity. When we see an object, the mind is actively going through the process of constitution. Husserl defines constitution as the giveness (appearance) of phenomena in the consciousness. Constitution is created through anticipation and intentionality; Husserl argues that objectivity is made clear to us when things are projected outside ourselves, and when things are based off of real world experience of things that already exist.
To counter this argument one may assert that man’s knowledge is limited by the five senses, and that we cannot trust our consciousness because it is distorted and incomplete. We cannot know reality because we can only access the world as a result of filtering our sensory impressions. Everything is subjective, and objectivity cannot be reached by means of constitution because we cannot know what we know. Husserl would respond by saying this is fundamentally not true. We do know the world through our senses by also by our consciousness. He would suggest that the counter argument is fundamentally flawed; if there is really no such thing objective reality, simply asserting such notion is objective. Therefore, Husserl argues we can know objectivity through investigation of our consciousness and our perception.
Lastly, Husserl claims that we can know reality through the notion of life-world or the world of our common lived experience. Husserl defines intersubjectivity as the common validation of a thing. For example when we purchase toothpaste from the store, we trust it is not poison. We simply don’t know if it is poison, but we trust that it is truly toothpaste. This communal trust allows us access to objectivity. The ideas of objective order and intersubjective trust are the basis of life-world. So, it is through our common lived experience we can know what is real. Our common truths and traditions are that we all partake in this communal trust. We trust or consolidate the certainty of our experience of reality. One can counter this argument by saying that there is no way to know reality by simply trusting the common validation of a thing. For example, the followers of Jim Jones trusted that they were drinking cool aid, but it was really laced with poison. Clearly, reality cannot be known by Husserl’s idea of intersubjectiviy and life-world. Husserl would respond to this argument by simply saying by common validation of something we can know it to be real. In the case of Jim Jones, he knew that he was poisoning his followers; thus the communal trust has been broken illuminating the objective reality.
The question of objectivity in Heidegger is answered by understanding the Dasein. Heidegger takes on an existentialist perspective of understanding reality through the human being. For Heidegger the concept of being is the most crucial point and most important concept of human life. Knowing the world means knowing being.
Being can be defined as both a verb and an entity. Being means to be or the is-ness of something (Sein), whereas being is defined as an entity. Heidegger argues that the human being known as the Dasein (being there) has a distinct relation with being for many reasons: it understands being, asks about (being because inquiry is one of his modes of being), decides its own being, and projects itself into the future. Heidegger continues to argue that the Dasein is described as being-in because it move sin an interactive way. Heidegger asserts that being-in is not simply spatial; instead, the Dasein has a relationship with what is around him. The Dasein interacts and dwells in the way and by the way of his being. For example when you ask a child what he wants to be when he grows up, he will say something along the lines of, “ I want to be a doctor.” The Dasein is always in a state of Being and relates to the world by being. Hence, by investigating being one can come to know reality.
Heidegger goes on to argue that by investigating our moods we can better understand being and in turn objectivity. Our moods, a universal category of existence of the Dasein, reveal the relationship between the Dasein, the world, and being. We can understand the world by our moods through various expressions both positive and negative. For example, Positive moods such as “I am on top of the world,” are expressions that relate positively to the world, and by doing so the world around us is related objectively. Heidegger asserts that we color the world with our moods and become more aware of reality. Heidegger describes a lack of mood as not being connected with the world. Thus, Heidegger argues that moods reveal reality and give an intuition of the world. To counter this argument one might say that our moods are purely subjective and keep us away from knowing reality. Moods do color our world, but no objectivity can be found in investigating ones mood. Heidegger would respond by saying moods are not emotional accidents that shut out our reasoning and being, rather they cause us to be more aware of the world around us.
Heidegger specifically argues that fear is a way to be connected with objectivity. Heidegger asserts that fear discloses the world in the most extreme way and is the best way to encounter the reality. Fear causes us to anticipate and be more aware of the world around us. As earlier mentioned, Heidegger exclaims that we experience the world or this global intuition through our moods, however he proclaims we know the reality better by our fear. One may counter this argument by claiming the complete opposite. Fear might keep us from knowing the world. For example, if one is afraid of taking an exam, this fear does not disclose the world to him in an extreme way, rather it keeps him from knowing the world and knowing reality. Heidegger would reject this and would respond by saying that when we are afraid our senses are heightened and we are more responsive and cognizant of reality and ourselves.
Lastly Heidegger goes on to assert that objectivity can be revealed through the fall of the Dasein. Heidegger argues the Dasein falls because it was “thrown” into the world without choice and without protection, so in order to survive it must learn to cope with the dangers of the outside. Heidegger views this falling as a natural phenomenon, both excusable and apart of human nature. Heidegger discusses that the falling of the Dasein takes form in three different ways: Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. He argues that these three forms of falling are all inauthentic ways of being: superficial, lacking depth and meaning.
One may counter this argument by saying that authenticity can by rooted in inauthenticity. For example when participating in idle talk or curiosity, one might find oneself interested and intrigued about a subject that was not interesting to them before. For instance, the curiosity of a car accident might intrigue one to help a person in need of distress. The idle talk about the weather might spur a genuine and heartfelt conversation. Inauthentic ways of being can lead one to be authentic. Heidegger would dispute this argument claiming that when one talks idly or is curious they are not acting out of true concern but rather by selfish impulses brought about by our fall and “thowness” into the world. Heidegger would go on to say that being manifests and hides itself by ways of authentic and inauthentic ways of being. Heidegger describes authenticity as having ethical, aesthetical, and logical value. He goes on to describe authenticity as being in the world with resoluteness and realizing ones own potentiality of being by taking care of ones soul though self examination, balance, and involving oneself in the arts of poetry and literature. Heidegger asserts when we act authentically, we come to know reality and ourselves. Heidegger goes on to define inauthenticity as an escape of ones own potentiality of being. Therefore, Heidegger argues through authentic rather than inauthentic living we can objectively know the world.
In conclusion both Husserl and Heidegger address objectivity in different respects. Husserl asserts that the answer is found in perception and consciousness. Through exploration of our mind we can know reality. On the other hand, Heidegger answers the question of objectivity by understanding the Dasein. Knowing the world means knowing being. Thus both Philosophers believe that reality and objectivity exist and can be understood.

Figures of Mediation in Gadamer
This paper discusses the three figures of mediation in Gadamer: Art, Tradition, and Language. Gadamer asserts that we know reality and an objective revelation of the truth through these three figures of mediation. The view of Gadamer as well as arguments and counterarguments with respective examples are examined.
Gadamer asserts that we know truth and reality through mediation. He discusses that these forms of mediation are not exclusively subjective constructs but are mainly objective revelations of reality and truth, despite the subjective dimension. As mentioned, Gadamer argues that we know reality through three figures of mediation: Art, Tradition, and Language.
Gadamer is a Platonist and believes that truth can be reveled through art. He defines art as self-presentation of truth and being. Gadamer argues through our own interpretation of art we can access reality. The true thing is being depicted through the art. The colors, shapes, and images all are pointing to some objective truth. Subjectivity is present; however, the objective truth is being revealed. For example when gazing upon an artist’s depiction of the crucifixion of Christ, we are able to ascertain certain truths and characteristics that cause us to be in contact with reality. The emotions that they muster and the event itself come together in harmony to mediate reality and truth. Gadamer asserts that mediation in general is like a play. This metaphor can be used to understand the revelation of being through art. A play is mediated through human agents and language, but what really counts is the objective truth. Thus, despite subjective involvement, mediation reveals objective truth.
Gadamer continues by discussing tradition. He asserts though there are mistakes in tradition, truth and reality are still being revealed. The Hermeneutic circle explains that in trying to understand the world, we already have a pre-understanding that has molded us by family, society, language, and tradition. Gadamer argues that we know things through our prejudice, and we know others and ourselves through our mediation of reality. He affirms we can defend our prejudices against tradition by way of personal investigation and questioning by reason. Traditions reveal truth about the human person by relating the human person to something beyond itself. Gadamer argues that traditions globally reveal truth and reality when they preserve life and treat humans with dignity. Gadamer also argues that all traditions cherish life and insert the human being within universe in revelation. Thus, by observation and perception as well as history and tradition we can know and understand reality.
To counter Gadamer’s argument one may assert that not all tradition cherishes life and brings us into contact with reality. Certain traditions may be rooted in falsehoods. For example, if it were tradition within one’s family to never marry outside of one’s own ethnicity, this tradition would fail to cherish life and treat all humans with dignity. This may keep us farther away from reality. In response to this argument Gadamer might assert that though this family does have a tradition that condemns interracial marriage, truth and reality is still being revealed. This rejection causes one to be confronted with a choice to either refuse or accept this tradition. Both ways truth and reality is being revealed. One might respond to this argument that relying on traditions that may or may not have dysfunction keeps us away from knowing or embracing reality. Trusting a tradition to be true with out reasonable investigation or questioning seems null. Gadamer would assert that traditions are rooted in reason from their inception. Thus, Gadamer would continue to say that tradition as a form of mediation assures us access to reality.. Gadamer argues that tradition and authority reveal truth and are not simple artifacts of our subjectivity or culture. Thus, Gadarmer argues that tradition tells a lot about the order of the universe. There is much knowledge to be understood through tradition.
Gadamer goes on to assert that we as human beings are historical; we are made up of the past, present, and future, and in order to understand ourselves we must consider both the situation and the horizon. The horizon of the present is constantly being formed by the past and future and is tested by our prejudices. Gadamer proclaims that history works on us without us even realizing it. The effects of history are not a tyranny but rather recognition of tradition. For example in the course of ones life, one might change his beliefs, morals, and traditions. This evolution through time is the historical aspect that molds us to be who we are. Hence, mediations by history and tradition reveal the truth and reality and are not mystifications.
Gadamer affirms that the order of the universe manifests itself through authority. Gadamer defines authority as the amount of truth one has and is the result of order. He argues that authority gives order to the universe and to human life all the while bearing truth and reality. Gadamer believes authority is good in its nature and is recognition of order, ultimately based on an act of acknowledgement and knowledge of one superior in judgment and insight. He goes to argue that authority must be earned and is hinged up an act of reason. Authority has nothing to do with blind obedience. Thus, authority implies rationality. Gadamer disputes that if all authority were a falsification or mystification a community would not be able to exist.
To counter this argument one might say that not all authority is hinged upon reason and or is earned. One might give the example of a son of a rich man who came into a position of authority to run a company. This man did not earn his right to lead, and the people under him are obliged to be obedient to him. Gadamer could respond to this argument and state that there is a difference between power and authority. The rich man’s son did not earn his position to run the company therefore, because did not earn this position and is not respected by his coworkers he would not be seen as an authority figure but rather a figure in power. Thus, authority conveys a truth about reality and is based in objectivity.
The 20th century is the century of language and the trend was the departure of classic philosophy towards reason and structure. In the classical view, language is seen as a tool to express thoughts; Language expresses thoughts that come first. Gadamer, in contrast, debates language is not a tool rather is simultaneous with thinking. He maintains the Hermeneutic view that thoughts do not come before language; they come at the same time and depend on each other. Language and concepts are not separated. For example when you think, you think in language, they are consubstantial and cannot be divided. The classical view of language emphasizes that thinking is universal and that language is successive; language comes after thinking and can be expressed in all languages. Gadamer rejects this view and holds that different languages correspond to a different way of thinking. For example in Spanish there are certain words of endearment that would be viewed as insulting in English. For example, the word Panshita, literally translates into chubby or fatty in English. This goes to show that different languages relate with a different way of thinking, and thinking is not universal. To Gadamer concepts are dependent upon language, and language is not separate from concepts. Each unique language has a certain image of reality and reflects a particular worldview.
In conclusion Gadamer asserts that we know truth and reality through mediation, specifically: Art, Tradition, and Language. Gadamer claims that these forms of mediation are not exclusively subjective constructs but are mainly objective revelations of reality. Hence, it is only through mediation that we can access true objectivity.

Derrida’s Philosophy of the Other
This paper discusses Derrida’s philosophy of the other. By means of deconstruction and investigation of difference, one can know reality and understand objectivity. The view of Derrida as well as arguments and counterarguments with respective examples are assessed.
Things that seem used, broken, old, and unfinished are rooted in Derrida’s idea of deconstruction. Derrida claims deconstruction means to take apart; to save what is hidden or ignored; recuperate what most ignore, throw away, and leave by sight; movement against the monopoly of the center; marginal.
Derrida, a Jewish philosopher born in Algeria, moved to France and created a philosophy that takes into account diversity and differences of the other. It is because of his mixed background that he relates to the other. Derrida explains that western metaphysics is obsessed with the general, universal, one, and the same. He argues that metaphysics throws away the difference.
Derrida being of Jewish descent identifies with the other. The idea of otherness is rooted in the Jewish exile and awaiting for the Messiah’s return. Derrida asserts that western metaphysics is making a violence against difference and anything that is different by focusing on the universal and general, not individual. By doing this, Derrida emphasizes that we cannot know reality and truth when we reject what is different. Derrida argues that one has an incomplete view of reality when the difference is neglected or thrown away. In order to understand reality, one must embrace and understand the difference or the other. We must recuperate what is ignored and hidden to understand the difference. For example we have been raised in a society that promotes us to conform to the universal and to focus on commonality rather than differences, whether that be in race, gender, sexual orientation, or creed. Society tries to combat this difference by addressing the importance of tolerance of the other. There is no way to reject there are differences in all people and in all things; however Derrida would argue that tolerance is not enough to really embrace and understand the other. Whether it is trying new foods, interacting with difference races, or wearing different cologne, Derrida asserts that only by acceptance not just tolerating the other can we know reality. We are all different; yet try to conform to the same because of our conditioning and our fear and insecurity of the difference that is in others and that lives in us.
To counter Derrida’s argument, one could say that by focusing too much on the difference we miss what unites us to one another, the universal. Centering too much on any one aspect, being either the other or the universal will essentially fail to bring balance and full understanding of reality. Derrida in response to this counter argument argues, that what unites us is our differences not just our similarities. Derrida’s view of the other is easy for me to accept; however, it is essential that there is balance between the other and the universal. Denying the differences of the other has been seen throughout history in slavery, the holocaust, and religious wars, and within these circumstances there was literal violence against the other. Rejecting the other, in essence, is rejecting truth and reality, yet in the same way rejecting what is common achieves this same denial. It is only though questionable reason of our prejudices and openness to what is different we can come to know both sides of the story, and in turn know reality and ourselves. As Derrida asserts, our differences make us unique and reveal objectivity, and if we deny or reject these differences we are in essence denying whom we really are.
Derrida goes on to discuss that the most important difference is the human other. The other is the only object in the world that interacts differently, and is the most objective thing in the world. One cannot dominate the other completely; the human other relates in such a way that cannot be controlled or dominated. Simply put the human other is the most different. Derrida argues that naturally the human other is the most objective and unique object on the planet. In denying this difference one is in essence denying truth, because in our differences there lies what is real.
One might counter this argument by saying that the human other is in fact the most subjective thing on his planet rather than objective, and the other can be dominated or controlled. Because we are different and have different beliefs and perceptions, we are more subjective rather than objective, and it is possible for the human other to be controlled mentally. For example, a woman in an abusive relationship is being controlled mentally by another, and is unable to leave the relationship. Derrida would respond to this by saying that indeed we are all subjective beings, but we are also the most objective by way of our differences and our uniqueness. As far as the abused woman goes, though she is being mentally and physically controlled, her significant other cannot control her thoughts or emotions, which makes her objective. Thus, the human other is the most different and most objective thing in the universe.
In conclusion Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction and the other gives another dimension to understanding reality. Only by accepting what is different, we can know objectivity. Derrida argues that one has an incomplete view of reality when the difference is neglected or thrown away. Derrida emphasizes we must recuperate what is ignored and hidden to understand the difference and thus understand the world and ourselves.