To what extent can German Nationalism be regarded as a mass movement in the period between the beginning of The French Revolution and the End of World War 1.
In the early 1940’s popular military parades through German Streets by soldiers bearing the insignia of the National-Socialist party who preached the chauvinist nationalist ideals of German expansion and superiority were commonplace. However, only a century earlier Nationalism was a minor movement suffering near-constant repression. Indeed what is most surprising about the period 1789-1919 in relation to German Nationalism is the lack of support for an ideology that would later grip German hearts and minds across the nation. Certainly in instances of military conflict and threat support for nationalism can be seen to grow, yet without this military impetus it struggled for popularity, instead finding itself actively repressed by politicians or other rival ideologies.
1890-1919 can be seen as a rare period where German Nationalism did attract a mass following. Certainly this was most evident in the rise of colonial pressure groups carrying a chauvinist nationalist message, with the Kyfferhausen movement attracting 2.9 million members with its militaristic message. Similarly even the less famous pressure groups had significant membership with the Navy League, Eastern Marches association and Agrarian league containing a total of 2.25 million Germans bound together by a common interest in imperialism and National greatness. Moreover a more extreme form of German Nationalism was also on the rise within these organisations with over 40,000 vociferous Germans preaching a radical nationalist message of anti-Semitism and social-Darwinism from within the halls of the Pan German League. This apparent mass support for nationalism can also be seen in the rise of the Cult of Bismarck amongst the populous, with hundreds of newly-built monuments and towers becoming the focal point of nationalist ‘pilgrimages’ by the supporters of this ever-growing movement. The Wars Bismarck fought in the 1860’s and 1870’s ultimately achieved early nationalists greatest goal; the creation of a unified German Nation, thus this aforementioned pro-Bizmarck support can be seen to chime with the notion of nationalism’s mass appeal. This point is highlighted by the fact that the German Social Party voted in favour of War credits, thus implicitly showing their support for a war that was nationalist in nature as well as arguably the nationalist movement that fostered it. However it is important to appreciate that Nationalism was not alone in its ability to stoke up large-scale support, with the SDP gaining 1 million votes by 1890 and the most seats in the Reichstag in 1912 with ¾ of Berlin voting socialist. The German Socialist had its roots in the writing of Karl Marx, a man who claimed that nation’s (the focal point of any nationalist ideology) were mere false constructs designed to keep the workers of the world divided and weak, with. Consequently it is possible to see this rise in support for a party with that stressed loyalty to class rather than nation as undermining the notion that German nationalism enjoyed total support amongst the German populous, however its major presense within German society in the form of pressure groups and Bismarckian monuments arguably shows it to be a mass movement, albeit not a universal one.
However this level of support can be seen to have died down by 1918. Although there was a civil truce in operation by 1914 with Wilhelm II claiming to “recognise only Germans” this fragile unity was beginning to crack by 1916 with socialists becoming more and more vocal in their opposition to an increasingly aggressive and expansive war. Moreover German armies in this War were organised along state boundaries; something which arguably promoted particularism; an ideal that was diometerically opposed to the nationalist dogma. Therefore while there was some support for nationalism in the form of freikorps that had formed by 1919, the growing sense of disunity both at home and on the front appears to show that any attempt to claim that German nationalism enjoyed sustained mass support during the war is hyperbole.
A century earlier Freikorps had also appeared on the streets of Germany to support the nationalist cause. Indeed it seems possible to see the period of 1789-1815 as a time when nationalism had nurtured a substantial base of support, with the French occupation providing the stimulus for this growth as thousands of Germans rallied together against this common foreign foe. This theme of strong nationalist fervour is exemplified in the mass uprising of 100,000 Germans in Saxony against their French oppressors, with Blackborune remarking that “German Nationalism enjoyed more support here than it would for the next 30 years”. Moreover nationalism did not only receive support from the military community in this period with its Romantic cultural side gaining intellectual advocates in the form of Jahn, Ardnt and Fichte. Neverthless, although nationalism may have attracted thousands of Germans to its cause in this period , this figure pales in comparison to the millions would become involved in the same ideological movement a century later. Therefore while German Nationalism may have surged up to a substantial level via the resentment caused by the Revolutionary Wars and occupation, it arguably still appears to have been some way off the benchmark of mass support that the movements early 20th century form provided.
Despite the further military impetus of the wars of unification, nationalism had faded back down to a relatively minor movement by the time of German unification in 1871. Although there were memorable instances of nationalist in the decade leading up to unification they were usually manufactured and short-lived. Bismarck, ever the cynical disciple of realpolitik, looked to stir up passionate nationalist feelings at the prospect of another potential French occupation, presenting Napoleon as the Caesar of the Rhine, whipping up “white hot nationalist fervour”(Carr) in the process. However it is important to appreciate the political cynicism that underlined this nationalist outcry, with Bismarck merely encouraging nationalism in order to justify a war of Prussian expansion against France with the national token and looked to immediately repress it the minute this ‘national’ victory had been achieved. Consequently the cynical devious desires on which this upsurge of nationalism where based arguably show it to have far too unstable foundations to be regarded as a major movement, let alone a mass one. True, some may argue that unification’s inherently nationalist nature means that there must have been some large-scale nationalist movement from which it had been Bourne, yet in reality unification came from top-down rather than bottom up. Indeed unification had its roots in the corridors of power rather than any nationalist movement with Carr remarking that it came about via a process of “cabinet politics”. Moreover, the possibiliuty of there being any form of large scale nationalist movement in this period is further undermined by the strength of south German separatism. Certainly the fact that these south German states fought against Prussia and her, albeit cynical, desire for unification, arguably represents an active negation of nationalism and its ideals of German unity. Consequently it does not seem libellous to brand the years between 1860 and 1871 as a period of minimal, as opposed to mass, nationalism.
Similarly, the military threats of the 1840’s and 1850’s also sparked some nationalist support, albeit even more minimal. Cetrainly German nationalism appears to have some support in this period with the fear of invasion generated by The Rhine crisis of 1840 attracting more people to the movement, while 5 years later the Schelswig-Holstein crisis provoked a similar reaction. However this reaction came in the form of a relatively minor singing festival, with the attendees arguably being attracted more by the prospect of a fun day out than any deep-lying nationalist sentiment, as shown by the fact that many children attended it. Nevertheless a more politically-coherent form of nationalism could be found in 1859, with Italian unification provoking the creation of the 25,000-strong nationalist pressure group the Nationalverein. The extent to which this can be regarded as being indicative of mass support for nationalism, however, is undermined by the fact that similar pressure groups would form less than half a century late with more than 100 times the number of members. Therefore although German Nationalism may have been given a boost in popularity by the military threats and unifications and appeared to be on the rise during the 1840’s and 1850’s, it is important to appreciate that it was still a movement in its early formative stages at this point, as opposed to the solid mass movement it would later become.
Without the any form of military impetus German Nationalism struggled even more to attract support. Indeed while the burschenshaften student movement of the early 1800’s climaxed in nationalist festivities at the 1817 Wartburg festival, the fact that under 500 people actually turned up erodes the idea that this represented any form of a major movement. Moreover the very idea that this festival was a true indication of nationalist fervour is somewhat undermined by the contrived nature of the fact that the participants were celebrating Luther, a great German protestant hero, when a significant proportion of the nation was catholic. Furthermore any form of national sentiment that did arise from this event was quickly stamped out by the restriction imposed by Metternich’s Karslbad decrees in 1819, while as a somewhat paranoid politician with a constant desire for control it is possible to see his Carlsbad decrees as reflecting his constant desire to restrict independent thought, as opposed to representing a sign of the damgerous strength of the nationalist movement. This pattern of minor nationalist growth and repression continued through this period with the brand of mild Liberal Nationalism displayed by the Gottingen 7 and Young Germany movement being actively silenced by Metternich’s introduction of The 6 Articles in 1833. Consequently German Nationalism can arguably be regarded as little more than a minority intellectual movement in between 1815 and 1840.
Nevertheless some still do point to the German revolutions as evidence that German Nationalism had acquired an impassioned network of mass support as early as 1848. However, although patriotism was certainly running high at this time, the revolt had more to do with a lack of food in the peoples’ stomachs than nationalist thoughts in their heads. Indeed socio-economic factors seem far more important than ideological ones in explaining this revolution, as with sharp drop in wages and sharp rise in grain and potato prices (the mainstays of a typical German’s diet) people were facing starvation; a situation that was being daily worsened by the influx of rural job-seeking Germans into the already crammed cities. At the same time many German workers felt threatened by the advances in mechanisation that had come with the country’s industrial take-off, a fear which the collapse of the textile industry amplified. Consequently it is possible to see these socio-economic factors as combining to form a potent mix of hunger and anger that boiled over in the aggressive uprising of 1848. The degree to which these uprisings can be seen as nationalist revolts is further undermined by the fact that they were arguably liberal in nature, with Liberal politics latching onto the hole which the riots had made in the Holy Alliance’s Authority. Certainly although the revolts led to the creation of a Frankfurt Parliament with the, seemingly nationalist, aim of unifying Germany this desire was one shared and put forward by German Liberals, as the revolution had given them, rather than their nationalist counterparts, the ability to enter the corridors of power. Moreover the speed with which the rebellions were ultimately put down shows that if there was ever any support for nationalism encapsulated within them, it was highly flimsy and superficial in nature. Consequently the events of 1848 arguably show that despite a supposed nationalist revolution, German nationalism still remained the ideology of an intellectual minority rather than the masses.
Although the Frankfurt Parliament’s ultimate desire for national unity was finally made a reality by Bismarck in 1871, nationalism still remained a relatively minimal movement for the 20 years that followed. Certainly with the national question finally solved the movement died down, having lost the ideological driving force that had initially attracted Germans to the ideology. Indeed if there were any mass movements between 1871 and 1890 they were rooted in the ideas of class and religion as opposed to nation, with Bismarck’s anti-catholic and anti-socialist measures conversely leading to rise in support for both causes, with catholic centre party becoming the biggest party in the Reichstag while the SDP gained over a million votes in the 1890 election. Therefore German nationalism in this period appears to have remained at a relatively minor level with the masses being ideologically polarised along religion and class-based, rather than national, lines.
In conclusion defining precisely what constitutes a mass movement is not an exact science, however the nationalist hysteria and patriotic fervour which characterised the 1890’s and 1900’s in the build up the Outbreak of war appear to physically epitomise this idea of mass support. Certainly German Nationalism’s popularity appears to resemble a parabola, starting out as a hugely-supported expression of anti-French patriotism following the Revolutionary Wars, before becoming stifled under political suppression and other competing movements. However at the turn of 20th century it rose up ,phoenix-like, out of the ashes of this past oppression and dis-interest, reaching new peaks of infectious public support. Nevertheless while the Wilhelmine era in Germany may have seen German nationalism reach its full potential as a mass movement, that does not hide the fact that throughout the majority of the 19th century it was anything but this, operating as a minority, largely intellectual movement.