Military Law Seminar
Fall, 2014

Article

The Influence of Social Media on Homegrown Terrorists and Balancing Data-mining Between Civil Liberties and National Security

Julianne Grim
[Insert Abstract]
[The focus of this article will be narrowly tailored to include the most popular social media sites in the western world, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube and how they are utilized by known terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL)]

I. The Developing World of Social Media
Social media activity accounts for over 22 percent of all time spent online in the United States, making it the number one activity people do on the internet. However, the world of social media extends beyond Facebook Twitter and YouTube. Social networking sites are developing faster than they can be analyzed and popping up all over the world. But social media is not a new phenomenon either, people have been seeking out like minded individuals in online communities for nearly two decades. During the infancy stages of social media people logged onto forums, blogs, chat rooms etc. Each social media platform varies slightly from the next - allowing for different types of content to be generated - but each platform seeks to accomplish two goals; generating content and engaging with other interested people.
Modern terrorists are taking advantage of the fruits of globalization and modern technology, especially advanced online communication technologies that are used to plan, coordinate and execute their deadly campaigns. No longer geographically constrained within a particular territory, or politically or financially dependent on a particular state, they rely on technologically modern forms of communication-including the internet. The internet has long been a favorite tool for terrorists. a. Understanding the Social Landscape
Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, was in high school when America was attacked Tuesday, September 11, 2001 - three years later he created a website that transformed communication. TheFacebook.com debuted Feburary 4, 2004 and was only accesible by students at Harvard Univeristy. Over the next few years Facebook began to transform; first requiring users to have a valid “.edu” email address, next they allowed any individual with an e-mail address over the age of 13, and finally in 2007 businesses large and small could join the ranks and start building a network of brand loyalists.Today, Facebook has 1.35 billion monthly active users worldwide and a robust advertising network that generated $2.957 billion in revenue ($3.203 billion total revenue in Q3 2014 ). Facebook penetration is highest in North America, 69 percent, trailing only slightly by Middle East-Africa, 67 percent.
Facebook was one of the modern day pioneers of social media platforms. The websites’ interface and abilities have developed over the last 10 years allowing users to form “groups”, send instant messages, share videos, links and photos. By adding ways for users to upload and generate content Facebook created, and is always changing, an algorithm. Every time someone visits News Feed there are on average 1,500 potential peices of content they can see - but users only have enough time, on average, to consume 300 pieces of content. Facebook’s algorithm collects information about what you do while on Facebook (what links users click, groups they belong to, interests listed in profiles, etc.) and then the algorithm chooses what content it thinks would be most relevant for you to see at that time.
A special report by the US Department of Homeland Security, in 2010, listed various terrorist uses of Facebook: (1) as a way to share operational and tactical information, such as bomb recipes, weapon maintenance and use, tactical shooting, etc. (2) as a gateway to extremist sites and other online radical content by linking on Facebook group pages and in discussion forums (3) as a media outlet for terrorist propaganda and extremist ideological messaging. (4) as a wealth of information for remote reconnaissance for targeting purposes. A different, shorter, approach to social media evolved out of now defunct tech start up Odeo. On March 21, 2006, Jack Dorsey sent the first tweet: “just setting up my twttr.” It would be the beginning of a revolution. Now people from all over the world and many different fields and professions are saying it all in 140 characters or less. The microblogging site was one of the only parts of the business that CEO Evans William thought was valuable. In a letter to investors Williams stated, “...by the way, Twitter, which you may have read about, is one of the pieces of value that I see in Odeo, but it's much too early to tell what's there.”
When the site was created its main goal was to find a way to send text messages on cell phones. The 140 character limit was set because 160 characters was the SMS carrier limit and Odeo wanted to leave room for the username. Three years after the first tweet, Twitter, was credited as the place where people first learned of the U.S. Airways plane crash in the Hudson River. This tweet, which linked to an image of the downed aircraft, was one of the first references of the incident and was seen worldwide. Today, there are over 500 million tweets sent per day by 284 million monthly active users of which 77% of the accounts are outside the United States.
How people use Twitter has changed significantly as the platform has matured. When Twitter was created users intended to send short messages to their network, making it a two way communication tool. Today the platform is leveraged heavily as a “reading tool” (one way communication) and less as a communication tool. Meaning, users are able to see real time, unfiltered updates from news sources, commentators and other users. This is not to say that less content is being created, rather more content is being created and broadcasted. Unlike Facebook, Twitter does to filter content through an algorithm. This mean that Twitter is not “selecting” which Tweets it thinks you would be more interested in. Social media algorithms are complex and ever changing, in fact, the topic has been subject to many case studies. However, what is most important to understand is that Twitter does not prioritize content which, in some ways, can be an advantage over Facebook because of the real time nature of information that is shared.
Twitter has recently emerged as the most popular channel for terrorists’ because Twitter takes advantage of a recent trend in news coverage that often sacrifices validation and in-depth analysis for the sake of almost real-time coverage. Thus allowing terrorists to disseminate pure and unedited messaging.
Technological advances, particularly the increased availability of sophisticated, but cheap and easy to use video capturing hardware and editing software meant that video began to play a much greater role in the jihadists information strategy following the 2001. However, much of this video content remained quite difficult to access for Westerners and others as it was located on Arabic-only websites, many of which were also quite unstable in terms of changing their URLs regularly. The establishment of YouTube helped to streamline the dissemination of video content.
YouTube, an online repository facilitating the sharing of video content, came into existence in 2005. The website receives more than 1 billion unique visitors each month with over 80% of the website’s traffic comes from outside of the United States. Currently users upload 100 hours of video every minute. YouTube is argued to be an alternative to television as a medium that allows for jihadists to reach massive, global audiences. Additionally, the social networking aspects of the site also allows interaction between those who post videos and those who comment.
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been the dominant social networking sites that terrorists have been active trying to recruit and engage individuals. But the world of social media expands beyond what is examined within this article. For example the Russian-language VK network 190 million, and the Chinese QQ network 700 million. Platforms such as Reddit (which reported 400 million unique visitors in 2012) and Tumblr, which has just reached 100 million blogs, can support extremely niche communities based on mutual interest. Terrorists groups have turned to social media not only because traditional counterterrorism agencies and tools have disrupted their traditional online presence but also because the new media offers huge audiences and ease of use. b. Examining Social Media Usage by Individuals of Known Terrorist Groups and the Growing Threat of Homegrown Terrorists
Disseminating propaganda is essential to the radicalization process and social media has been instrumental in propagating al-Qaeda messages of hate to thousands of people. The internet has accelerated the potential for this ideology to reach beyond specific communities and enables the perception of a virtual community of like-minded radicals. However debatable the scale of the homegrown radicalized Islamic terrorism may be, it seems beyond doubt that the threat of domestic terror is alive and well in the United States.
It is clear that the threat of al-Qaeda-style terrorism is not limited to the core group. Al-Qaeda continues to threaten America directly, it also inspires its affiliates and other groups and individuals who share its violent ideology and seek to attack the United States claiming it is in the name of Islam.
For example, Colleen LaRose attracted the attention of law enforcement personnel in 2007 when she commented on YouTube, under the name “JihadJane,” that she was “desperate to do something somehow to help” suffering Muslim people. She enthusiastically posted and commented on YouTube videos of supporting al-Qaeda and their allies, but her enthusiasm for jihad went beyond watching videos and offered moral support as well. In addition to posting increasingly agitated messages on various websites about waging “violent jihad,” she wrote of jihad in several emails to individuals in the United States, Europe, and South Asia. Her case is a shocking example of how easy it can be to find jihadi content online and make connections with others who speak aspirationally about violent acts of terror against the United States.
LaRose’s story is not unique, in late 2009 five Northern Virginian men were arrested in Pakistan where the men told authorities they were on a mission to be martyred. The men, who came from middle-class families and were well integrated into American society, began watching YouTube videos that showed attacks on American troops. One of the men, Ahmed Abdullah Minni, became a regular commenter on the videos which led a Taliban recruiter to send Minni messages. After Saifullah first made contact with Mr. Minni via comments on YouTube, he exchanged messages with them by leaving draft e-mail messages at a shared Yahoo address. Militants, and other government officials, have often used this tactic to reduce the chance that intelligence agencies will intercept messages. By June 2010 the five men were found guilty on charges related to terrorism and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and fined $823. In 2011, Jose Pimentel was arrested for preparing bombs to use in attacking targets in New York City. Before his arrest, Pimentel had been very active on-line. He ran a blog, held two YouTube accounts, and operated a Facebook profile. His Facebook profile was registered under the name Muhammad Yusuf, includes "JIHAD E FISABEELILLAH" (jihad for the sake of Allah). As an analysis of Pimentel’s online activity reveals, he was “directly linked online to known extremists through whom he is connected to some hundreds of like-minded individuals. Pimentel's website, TrueIslam1.com, hosted an expansive archive of jihadist texts, with audio and video. Additionally, Pimentel's YouTube channel had collected more than 600 videos relating to radical and violent interpretations of Islam and his channel had more than 1,500 subscribers. Pimentel’s plans were fortunately intercepted and stopped before being executed. However, it is unknown the volume of people he was able to reach through social channels.
The most recent, homegrown, terror attack in the United States occurred in April of 2013 by two dissociated brothers without direct sponsorship from a formal terrorist group. Although, it is true that they were inspired by Islamist movements; Inspire’s latest issue claims them as one of their own, but there is still no real ties to any cell structure. Both men were active on social media sites in the United States and in Russia. It was through their social media activity that a uncovered a link between Tamerlan and radical cleric Islamic Fundamentalist preacher Sheikh Feiz Mohammad. That day, the volume of mentions of Feiz Mohammad on Twitter increased sevenfold. Additionally, Tamerlan was active on YouTube. He created two playlists, one titled “Terrorism” and the other “Islam.” While both men were active on social neither of them had a large following, prior to the bombing there were less than 100 views and comments on the YouTube playlist.
These are just three examples of how social media has been leveraged to further the havoc intended by terrorist organizations. Overall, there have been more than 40 plots by homegrown jihadists (that the public is aware of) to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11, most of which are intercepted before an attack on home soil. The activity detected in the United States has lacked the level of sophistication, experience, and access to resources of terrorists overseas. Their efforts, when disrupted, largely have been in the nascent phase, and authorities often were able to take advantage of poor operational tradecraft. However, the growing use of the Internet to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were available only in overseas training camps. II. Counterterrorism efforts via Social Media
Comparing the social media activity of Pimentel and the Tsarnaevs we see Pimentel’s ability to build up his social networking by producing content as opposed to the Tsarnaevs activity of being majority consumers of content. However, Pimentel was intercepted before he could act out his terror plans whereas the Tsarnaev brothers menaced the city of Boston for days, killing 3 people and injuring 264 others, before being apprehended. These two incidents, with very different outcomes, highlights the importance counterintelligence plays in being able to accurately identify those who are likely plotting, planning, and being indoctrinated to become a homegrown terrorist.
The challenge of “waging a global campaign against al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates” remains the central objective of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The spike in homegrown radicalization is coupled with an evolving threat abroad, where the United States faces myriad, complex security challenges inspired by various strands of Islamist extremist ideology. Adding to the issue is ease of communication between influencers abroad and potential homegrown terrorists. The key to stopping and ultimately defeating terrorist and the threat the pose is for the U.S. government be able to have open access to communication.
In 2006, the Director of National Intelligence defined “open source information” through Intelligence Community Directive Number 301 to be information that is publicly available and can be lawfully obtained by request, purchase, or observation. The directive mandates all open-source information be made available across the Intelligence Community (IC) unless expressly prohibited by law. Open-source information generally falls within one of four categories: (1) information widely available to anyone, (2) commercial data, (3) expert opinion data, and (4) limited-issue “gray” literature produced by the private sector, government agencies, and academia. Social media intelligence, commonly referenced to as SOCMINT, does not always easily fit into the category of open or secret intelligence (OSINT). SOCMINT is defined, not by the openness of the information on which it is based, but by its existence on a social media platform. The US Committee on Homeland Security considers OSINT to be a tool that federal state and local law enforcement agencies should use to develop timely, relevant and actionable intelligence; especially as a supplement to classified data.
The following types of SOCMINT might be considered as genuinely open-source and non-intrusive because there is little or no expectation of privacy; (1) Volunteered crowd-source intelligence through direct and explicit solicitation. (2) Where social media users have no reasonable expectation of a right to privacy, because they understand this content is likely to be shared and used (e.g. Twitter). (3) Network analysis through the use of ‘crawlers’ or ‘spiders’ these crawlers are used to physically map out online activity between people and websites (Facebook recently banned third party crawler activity without express consent).
A constant problem for intelligence services is detecting a terrorist before he acts. Social media sites provide the forum for individuals to aggregate information. The sites link people with varying degrees of relationship to one another due to family, personal, and professional connections or merely a common interest found through the Internet. Thus these sites foster the key conditions for group intelligence: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation. Thereby the government is able to leverage the data collected via social media to trace entire networks of contacts. The inherent problem that follows with advocating to allow the government to collect information is the balance of personal privacy concerns against national security threats. III. Weighing Civil Liberties against National Security Concerns On one hand the United States is facing a mounting effort from social media sites to protect civil liberties and privacy policies. To reassure customers about their use of customer data, some social networking sites like Facebook are experimenting with new technologies that allow consumers explicit control over how much information about them is publicly available.
The natural tension between protecting the nation and preserving civil liberty is squarely presented by the Government's bulk telephony metadata collection program. Edward Snowden's unauthorized disclosure of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) orders has provoked a public debate and this litigation.
In 1972, the Supreme Court urged congress to consider protective standards for the “criminal surveillances and those involving domestic security.” After the September 11th attacks, Congress expanded the Government's authority to obtain additional records. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act replaced FISA's business-records provision with a more expansive “tangible things” provision. Codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861, it authorizes the FBI to apply “for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” a. To disclose or not to disclose data-mining information and who gets to decide
Our intelligence and law-enforcement agencies are inundated with data, much of it public. Often times the agency chooses to focus on a particular subset of that data, disclosing what directly reveals a targeting priority, and indirectly reveals the methodologies and data used to make that selection. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth District has stated that, “[t]he internet, whether through search engines, websites, message boards, or social media profiles, provides a vast of amount of public information whose selective use may be central to confidential investigations and should not be disclosed.”
In late 2013 the Justice Department relaxed its long-standing gag order on certain types of data requests made to companies. This allowed companies like Facebook to publicize, in broad terms, how much customer information they must turn over to the government. The new policy will allow companies to report on national security letters as well as on requests from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). But they will be permitted to disclose the volume of requests only in wide numerical ranges. Previously, companies were prohibited from acknowledging that they received such requests.
Facebook has an entire portal for government request data that is updated every six months. The site began reporting in late 2012. In the initial 2012 report Facebook disclosed the total number of user-data requests it received from any and all government entities in the U.S. (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related requests). During the second half of 2012 Facebook received between 9,000 and 10,000 requests. The requests ranged from things local interests (i.e. a sheriff trying to find a missing child), to a federal marshal tracking a fugitive, to a police department investigating an assault, to a national security official investigating a terrorist threat. The total number of Facebook user accounts for which data was requested pursuant to the entirety of those 9-10 thousand requests was between 18,000 and 19,000 accounts. Which means with over 1.3 billion worldwide users less only .0014% have ever been subject to any formal request by an entity of the United States government. However, In the first six months of 2014, governments around the world made 34,946 requests for data — an increase of about 24% since the last half of 2013. Included in the 34,946 requests were 6 Title III requests.
Twitter has been one of the most protective of its users' rights of privacy. The company has taken the position that, “Twitter users own their own Tweets. They have a right to fight invalid government requests, and we continue to stand with them in that fight.” Most recently Twitter filed suit against the United States alleging that the restrictions on what the company can say publicly about the government’s national security requests for user data violate the firm’s First Amendment rights. Specifically, the Department of Justice informed Twitter that that “information contained in the [transparency] report is classified and cannot be publicly released” because it does not comply with their framework for reporting data about government requests under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and the National Security Letter statutes.
In a post-Edward Snowden world there is heightened awareness and scrutiny over the information that the government collects. Simultaneously we see technology companies are striving to reassure customers about their commitment to privacy. Thier motivation is self serving. First, if the tech companies do not answer customer privacy concerns their user base will drop if their user base drops so does their advertising and ultimately their revenue. On its face it is easy to support the civil liberty and privacy policy concerns of social networking sites and protecting the First Amendment, but in reality these efforts instill a false sense of security. b. Can the U.S. Government Compete with Terrorists on Social Media
Given the sensitivity of federal government programs responsible for monitoring and taking action against terrorism- related activities, much of the information regarding the organizations and their specific activities is deemed classified or law enforcement-sensitive and is not publicly available. But there has been public recognition of the United States’ continued effort to extinguish terrorism both at home and globally.
A recent study published by researchers at King's College in London found jihadists' presence on social media has had a strong influence on recruiting Westerners. The study created a database of 190 social media profiles. More than two thirds of these profiles are affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusrah or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) – two groups that have, at one point or another, maintained formal relationships with al-Qaeda. The study found that a large number of sympathizers receive their information about the conflict not from the official channels, but through so-called disseminators. Moreover, for most of those studied social media is no longer virtual: it has become an essential facet of what happens on the ground.
This falls in line with what was examined earlier, the influence and reliance on user generated and disseminated content via social networks. The question then follows, how can the United States combat these messages in a way that can have a meaningful impact on the counterterrorism efforts? In 2010, an interagency effort based in the Department of the State was established to challenge the advantages held by insurgent groups and terrorists online. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC is intended to “...coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents.” The CSCC is directly engaging young people, and sometimes jihadists, on websites popular in Arab countries, publishing a stream of anti-Islamic State messages. Additionally the group hosts a Facebook and Twitter in an effort to “… expose the facts about terrorists and their propaganda. Don’t be misled by those who break up families and destroy their true heritage.”

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[ 2 ]. Id.
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[ 8 ]. https://www.facebook.com/business/news/News-Feed-FYI-A-Window-Into-News-Feed
[ 9 ]. Id.
[ 10 ]. http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/12/09/facebook-friends-terror/
[ 11 ]. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4
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[ 13 ]. id.
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[ 21 ]. Id at 13.
[ 22 ]. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOS_Canada_paper.pdf
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[ 25 ]. “Homegrown” terrorism does not have any one, official definition. The “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007” defined homegrown terrorism as “the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a large group or individual born, raised, or operating primarily within the United States...in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h1955rfs.txt.pdf.)
[ 26 ]. Statement Of Secretary Janet Napolitano Before The United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs, "Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting The Terrorist Threat To The Homeland", 2010 Wl 3707666
[ 27 ]. Carrie Johnson, JihadJane, an American Woman, Faces Terrorism Charges, Wash. Post (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/09/AR2010030902670.html
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[ 29 ]. Id.
[ 30 ]. Id.
[ 31 ]. Asif Shahzad, “Police: Americans in Pakistan Had Taliban Contact,” Associated Press, December 12, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9319907
[ 32 ]. Mark Hosenball and Michael Isikoff, “Police Report Says Five Americans Wanted to Pursue Jihad After Being Inspired by YouTube Videos,” Newsweek, December 11, 2009, http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/ declassified/archive/2009/12/11/police-report-says-five-americans-wanted-to-pursue-jihad-after-being- inspired-by-youtube-videos.aspx.
[ 33 ]. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/world/asia/14pstan.html?_r=2&
[ 34 ]. Former CIA Director David Petraeus and former military intelligence officer Paula Broadwell used a similar email tactic in an attempt to hide their affair. Petraeus and Broadwell composed messages and instead of transmitting them, left them in a draft folder. Then the other person could log onto the same account and read the draft emails there. This avoids creating an email trail that is easier to trace. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/12/heres-the-e-mail-trick-petraeus-and-broadwell-used-to-communicate/
[ 35 ]. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25pstan.html?hp
[ 36 ]. http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/new-york-resident-arrested-terrorism.html
[ 37 ]. Lone Wolves in Cyberspace by Gabriel Weimann, JTR Volume 3, Issue 2 - Autumn 2012 citing Internet Haganah (2012). “Jose-Pimentel, a-k-a Mohammad-Yusuf”; available at: http://forum.internet-haganah.com/archive/ index.php/t-358.html.
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[ 39 ]. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/267/html citing data from topsy.com
[ 40 ]. Written Statement of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, Feb. 5, 2008, pp 9-10.
[ 41 ]. http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/marathon-bomb-case-evidence-leaks-26850896
[ 42 ]. U.S. National Security Strategy, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_secu- rity_strateg y.pdf.
[ 43 ]. “National Open Source Enterprise, Intelligence Community Directive Number 301
[ 44 ]. Idib at 37.
[ 45 ]. http://www.academia.edu/1990345/Introducing_Social_Media_Intelligence_SOCMINT_
[ 46 ]. id.
[ 47 ]. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-shouldnt-stop-terrorists-from-tweeting/2014/10/09/106939b6 -4 d9f-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html
[ 48 ]. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
[ 49 ]. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for East. Dist. of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).
[ 50 ]. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (“section 215”)
[ 51 ]. § 1861(a)(1).
[ 52 ]. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. F.B.I., 734 F.3d 460, 466 (6th Cir. 2013)
[ 53 ]. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/us-to-allow-companies-to-disclose-more-details-on-government-requests-for-data/2014/01/27/3cc96226-8796-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html
[ 54 ]. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
[ 55 ]. Ted Ullyot, Facebook Releases Data, Including All National Security Requests, Facebook Newsroom (June 14, 2013), http:// newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests (denying allegations of direct server access, but disclosing that U.S. government entities requested Facebook data between 9,000 and 10,000 times in the six months prior to December 31, 2012)
[ 56 ]. Id.
[ 57 ]. 19,000 accounts requested/1.35 billion MAU
[ 58 ]. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2014-H1/
[ 59 ]. Id. Specifically: (a court order issued by a judge requiring the disclosure of real-time user information upon a finding of probable cause that: (1) someone is committing a crime specified in te Wiretap Act; (2) particular communication related to that crime will be obtained through the wiretap; and (3) the crime involves the account being tapped. Additionally, the judge must determine that “normal” methods of investigation have failed, are likely to fail or would be too dangerous to try. A wiretap is required for Facebook to disclose the communications of a user in real time.)
[ 60 ]. H. Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN Tech (Aug. 30, 2012) (www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-media)
[ 61 ]. TWITTER, INC., Plaintiff, v. Eric HOLDER, Attorney General of the United States, The United States Department of Justice, James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendants., 2014 WL 5012514 (N.D.Cal.)
[ 62 ]. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf
[ 63 ]. http://www.businessinsider.com/state-department-isis-video-2014-9#ixzz3Jpks3sXq
[ 64 ]. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf
[ 65 ]. Id.
[ 66 ]. U.S. Department of State, “Ambassador Alberto Fernandez Appointed Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC),” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186790.htm
[ 67 ]. Id.
[ 68 ]. https://www.facebook.com/ThinkAgainTurnAway/
[ 69 ]. https://twitter.com/ThinkAgain_DOS
[ 70 ]. Id. at 58.