Faith Holloway
Dr Justin Sytsma
PHIL 105
May 5 2014
Critical Analysis of Psychological Egoism
Psychological egoism, as defined by the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2010), entails that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. This essay will explore the meaning of psychological egoism, how arguments can be justifiably presented and why this theory is commonly appealing to philosophers. Often supporters of psychological egoism will present arguments through theories such as Darwinism and Desire Satisfaction. This essay essentially aims to critically assess the substantiality of these arguments.
In order to correctly assess the arguments in favour of psychological egoism, firstly it must be stated what is implied by these arguments. Psychological egoism has many differences to other egoist theories such as ethical egoism, which state we should be selfish. Psychological egoism however states that all human actions are uncontrollably selfish, and that this is part of our human nature. It should be noted before continuing that this essay will be assessing this more radical form of psychological egoism , which identifies that ‘selfishness is’ the only way one can possibly performs actions, disregarding any consideration of others unless this aids their selfish action in some way. Psychological egoism can seem plausible to its supporters for a variety of reasons. Some of the most common include the concept that desires are entirely our own and therefore pursuing any desire or action is selfish, which supports the idea that we pursue desires for our own satisfaction. A state of self- deception of our motives is also recognized as a major appeal of egoism. Finally the concept of morality is also used within psychological egoism arguments, maintaining that the knowledge that good deeds are often rewarded. It is claims such as these which, in the egoists mind , expose selfless acts as in fact selfish.
Additionally this essay assumes ‘altruism’ as the concept of considering interest of both self and others. This is not to be confused with more biologically influenced ‘evolutionary altruism’ which instead suggests sacrificing ones wellbeing for others benefit. Now that psychological egoism is further explained and boundaries are established it is far easier to understand and assess the claims of those who argue for it within the essay.
This explanation then prompts another essential question; how do we know when an argument is ‘good’, or in more philosophically sophisticated terms ‘sound’? Arguments in the form of philosophical debate have a multitude of requirements in order to be deemed acceptable. Firstly they require consecutive premises which fundamentally are required to be true. In order to correlate a ‘sound’ argument, these need to be correct, justifiable and provable. The conclusion that follows these premises needs to be deemed as ‘valid’, meaning it correctly concludes the premises before it. It is this combination of true premises and a valid conclusion which forms an argument that can be accepted as logical and justifiable. For any philosophical argument to maintain credibility it must also logically dismiss all opposing theories to maintain dominance in its field. This is where evidence is needed to complete the argument holistically.
This exploration of what makes a good argument now allows for critical assessment of arguments in favour of psychological egoism. The two examples which will be used are that of Darwinism and Desire Satisfaction.
This first argument this essay will explore is Darwinism. As an evidential mechanism for psychological egoism, Darwinism boasts many supporters such as Richard Dawkins, Richard Alexander and Michael Ghiselin. Dawkins widely known book ‘The Selfish Gene’ provides insight into Darwinism ideology with quotes such as “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish” (9). Psychological egoists maintain this belief through scientific and evolutionary knowledge of Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection, typically asserting that “genetically induced altruism is not real altruism” (Radcliffe, 182). The Darwinism concept suggests that because selfishness has triumphed in the process of natural selection, we (humans) are a product of selfish actions. The argument is presented through the following premises and conclusion: 1. Darwin’s theory of evolution relies on competition of organisms for survival and evolution 2. Selfish actions will always beat altruist ones 3. ------------------------------------------------- Humans are a product of natural selection

Therefore humans must be selfish
As the first premise appears valid from knowledge of Darwin’s theory, it seems suitable to move to the second premise. The first flaw seems to be the presumptuous idea that selfishness always beats altruism. If selfishness was as successful as this argument suggests, presumably there would be boundless empirical evidence to support these claims. However there is in fact recorded evidence of altruism functioning better than selfishness, such as the example of worker bees noted by Richards in ‘Selfish Genes and Moral Animals’ (159). These bees, with no ability to reproduce themselves, still function in an altruistic state to serve the Queen. Selfish tendencies triumphing in natural selection is questionable considering selfless insects such as bees have not been eliminated or heavily reduced by natural selection. Considering this example opposes the claims made in premise two, it is indeed evidence for altruism evolving from natural selection.
Another more relatable example of beneficial selflessness to consider is carers, specifically parents who devote time and energy in order to raise their children. If they acted completely selfishly they would only consider their own idea of their child’s needs which does not directly correlate to being the actual needs of the child. This consideration of others needs would then in fact appear more beneficial to their survival and success in natural selection. The egoist may retort to this claim that this is indeed still selfish and purely for one’s own self-preservation, as natural selection favours us protecting our genetic offspring. However we can note other examples such as adoptive mothers who have no genetic connection to their children yet still maintain the same selfless nature that is expected of a parent. Or we could look at those who care for the elderly or sick, often sacrificing their own wellbeing in order to care for those who cannot care for themselves with little recognition. It is evident that selfless qualities hold value in a grander scheme than psychological egoists are willing to assess, whether conscious or not, whether in humans, animals or plants. Essentially the majority do not live in cut-throat environments where this kind of behaviour is necessary, which complies with Blackburn’s suggestion that selfishness is a matter of a selfish trait displayed within an environment, and not a simple constant trait (19). Darwinism is also flawed in this sense by assuming our genes interests are identical to our own interests (Radcliffe, 174). Genes do not feel or have motives; they simply do what they are designed to do. Thus, people can simply have a desire to help others, not because their genes are telling them it will benefit their chances in natural selection, but simply because they want to.
This links to a final flaw identifiable within Darwinism, which is the deceiving connection between function and psychological traits. Blackburn affirms this flaw claiming “the inference from function to overt psychology is simply fallacious” (2009). He further notes how this is equal to inferring sexual drives only serve the evolutionary function to create children. But we know this is not the case, in fact many people will have sex with the intention of avoided procreating and simply for pleasure. Hence we can also take pleasure in helping others even if this is not our evolutionary function according to Darwinism.
It seems from critically assessing the argument presented for Darwinism that the premises either hold invalidity or a lack of empirical evidence to substantially support the claims. The opposing examples of altruist nature noted insist that this argument cannot successfully dismiss opposing theories or validate its premises and consequentially its conclusion. Hence Darwinism cannot be seen as a sound argument in favour of psychological egoism.
The second argument in favour of psychological egoism that will be assessed is that of Desire Satisfaction. This argument consists of the premises that when desires are satisfied we feel satisfaction, and this is why we complete them. From this a conclusion is formed that we only fulfil desires for ourselves, and are therefore being inherently selfish. The argument is shown more clearly below. 1. We act to fulfil desires which results in self-satisfaction 2. -------------------------------------------------
We fulfil our desires only to gain this self-satisfaction
Therefore the action is selfish
Supporters of the Desire Satisfaction theory find this plausible through exploration of motives and the concept of desires being entirely our own. If we are only ever following our own desires for our own gain then the action must always be selfish.
However first and foremost, the initial premise is not entirely true. The concept that all completion of desires results in complete satisfaction is merely an assumption. If the completion of desires always resulted in only pure satisfaction, is it therefore assumed that we would never experience guilt, disappointment or other negative responses which we know is just not the case. Feinberg expands on this noting that actions can result in the “dividend” of satisfaction however “far too often, we get no dividend at all, or, even worse, the bitter taste of ashes." This first premise is also self-defeating when combined with the second. If we act to fulfil our desires, and fulfilling desires is selfish, then the capacity for altruism does not exist. If unselfishness cannot be defined or displayed by psychological egoists then there is really no weight or comparison available for selfishness. However for the sake of assessing the entire argument we will ignore this invalidity and move on to the second premise.
The second premise relies upon desire being entirely ours. This works as a tautology, as it would seem strange to question that our desires are not our own. However this broadened idea of ‘desire’ and ‘satisfaction’ present the biggest opportunity for the claims of desire satisfaction to be argued against. It seems there is an undistinguishable line between selfish desires being fulfilled and serendipitous consequences. Just because a desire has been fulfilled in the process of an action does not necessarily make this the dominant motivating desire for the action, which egoists seemingly ignore. Mercer uses an analogy of Sally baking a potato to exemplify this, insisting that just because a pleasant aroma that Sally enjoys is produced during the baking; it is not her sole reason for baking it (573). This illustrates how the claim of Desire Satisfaction doesn’t particularly work in everyday situations.
Another example to further illustrate this could be an anonymous donator of a large sum to a charity. Firstly, even if his desire to help others is achieved he may not necessarily gain pure satisfaction. He could instead feel guilt for not helping more or regret for giving away money that he needed. To call this action selfish is to use extremely constrained views of what selfishness means as defined by psychological egoism. To most it would seem this action isn’t selfish at all as he is helping others through a generous act to which he will probably gain no benefit except his own feelings of it. As noted before these may not be entirely positive either and even if so these actions are not being robbed of someone else or comprising anyone else’s happiness. Therefore in general everyday terms the donator would not be seen as selfish. An everyday definition of the word claims selfishness as requiring a lack of consideration for other people, which the donator does not seem to have. The first premise is not guaranteed, and the second doesn’t coincide with the donator’s obvious desire to help others. Even if this is seen as selfish, he is not thinking of himself when he does it and therefore is not motivated by self-satisfaction.
By presenting a general view of selfishness and no opposing definition of what selflessness would look like this argument is essentially correct, but with little to no empirical evidence which we have noted is required. Again this is a tautology, similar to a claim that “all actions are actions”. By claiming all actions are only ever selfish then the psychological egoist will always be right in her claims. The combination of invalid premises and consequentially invalid conclusion cannot produce a sound argument for the claims being made by Desire Satisfaction supporters. When we combine this with noted examples that contradict the argument is it justified to note it as inconclusive at this point in time.
It seems through critical analysis that there are identifiable flaws within arguments that favour psychological egoism. From defining a sound argument earlier, it is apparent that neither arguments assessed meets this criterion. The many examples which can easily be used by altruists to counteract the arguments should suggest loopholes within them. It seems at this point at least, that even some of the most popular arguments in favour of psychological egoism cannot sufficiently dismiss the rebuttals of psychological altruists and philosophers alike. A lack of empirical evidence is apparent in egoism supporters, and until this evidence becomes substantial enough to discredit the examples given that counteract it, it is merely another unsettled philosophical debate.

Works cited
Blackburn, Simon. “The Big Questions Philosophy.” London: Quercus Publishing Plc, 2009. 99-101. Print.
Dawkins, Richard. “The Selfish Gene.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, c1976. Print.
Mercer, Mark. “Psychological Egoism and Its Critics” The Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. XXXVI, 1998. 557-575. Print.
Radcliffe Richards, Janet. “Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction.” London: Routledge, 2000. 154-183. Print.
Shaver, Robert, "Egoism", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Web. 28 April 2014.