Environmental Pollution at Hindustan Lever’s
Kodaikanal Plant

In mid-2004, Hindustan Lever Ltd (HLL) executives looked back at the events of the past three years at their mercury thermometer factory in Kodaikanal in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu. After mercury leakage from the plant had been reported in March 2001, heavy expenditure had been incurred in environmental risk assessment, waste disposal and health monitoring. The expenditure had exceeded the total profits generated by the plant since its inception. But the pressure from NGOs, led by Greenpeace , who had been protesting since March 2001 had not subsided.

The NGOs had indulged in novel ways of keeping the issue alive. These included chaining themselves to the HLL branch office in Chennai on 15th November 2002, disrupting the Annual General Meetings (AGMs) of HLL held on 13th June 2003 and 29th June 2004, shouting slogans and brandishing placards and enlisting sympathy from ex-workers and the general public. Greenpeace also maintained the pressure on HLL through its website, photoalbums, posters, persistent media briefing and seminars. The NGOs had most recently attacked HLL in April 2004 in a seminar in Chennai.

Even as they waited anxiously for the regulator, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board’s (TNPCB) nod to start decontamination of equipment and remediation of soil, HLL’s senior managers believed they had discharged their duties conscientiously. They wondered what more was needed to be done to bring the whole episode to an amicable closure. Why had the events turned out to be far more complicated than anticipated?

Background Note
HLL, a 51% subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch Conglomerate, had acquired a tremendous reputation as one of India’s best-managed companies. Despite being the subsidiary of a Multinational Corporation (MNC), HLL was perceived to be more Indian than foreign, in the way it managed its operations, HLL’s origin went back to 1885 when the Lever Brothers was set up by ‘William Hesketh Lever’, in England. In 1888, the company entered India by exporting ‘Sunlight’, its laundry soap. In 1930, the company merged with ‘Margarine Unie’ (a Netherlands based company, which produced edible fats and margarine), to form Unilever. In 1931, Unilever set up its first Indian subsidiary, the Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company for production of vanaspati, followed by Lever Brothers India Ltd. in 1933 and United Traders Ltd. in 1935, for the distribution of personal products. In November 1956, the three Indian subsidiaries merged to form HLL in 1956. Unilever decided to offer part of its equity capital to Indian shareholders even though there was no regulatory requirement. HLL had been a listed and quoted company in India since 1957.

How it all began
It was in early March 2001, that news reached HLL’s senior management in Mumbai that something had gone wrong at the Kodaikanal thermometer plant. A query from Corporate Watch, an N.G.O, whether there had been any disposal of mercury contaminated waste (along with broken thermometers and ground glass) from the plant, came as surprising news to HLL’s top management. HLL management also learnt that a few NGOs had staged protests outside the plant on March 7, 2001.

HLL was not initially convinced about these allegations. Being a 100 % Export Oriented Unit (EOU), no raw materials or finished goods could leave the factory without the knowledge and prior permission of the customs authorities. Despite being confident that mercury or mercury bearing materials could not have left the plant, HLL executives decided to seek a clarification from the unit manager. On March 8th, 2001, HLL Director, Gurdeep Singh held a meeting of senior managers in Mumbai. After learning from the unit manager in Kodaikanal that the glass scrap and broken thermometers containing mercury lying in a nearby scrap yard at Munjikal was indeed from the thermometer factory, it was decided to suspend operations in the plant with immediate effect.

Ashok Gupta, Vice President (Legal and Corporate affairs), recalled , “There was a debate within the company regarding suspending the operations since this might send wrong signals. It would be as though HLL was admitting that things had gone wrong.” Despite these apprehensions, HLL went ahead and suspended the operations. Dr. Anil Bhaskar, SHE (Safety, Health and Environment) Co-ordinator , (Asian Business Groups) explained: “We wanted to freeze the situation and realised unless the operations were frozen it would not be possible to get to the root of the problem. The whole point was to find why a material, which was not supposed to move out of the factory, left the factory. We wanted to find out how if at all the systems and controls had been breached.”

HLL issued a press release on March 8, 2001, to clarify its position: “Allegations that scrap glass generated in the HLL Kodaikanal Thermometer Factory’s non-mercury area, purchased by a local scrap dealer more than 15 months back, contains some glass with mercury waste has caused the company enormous surprise and concern since such a possibility is remote given established systems and controls which are in place. However, to rule out any human error, HLL has decided to carry out a comprehensive audit of the operation of the factory, including a comprehensive review of disposal of wastes and glass scrap.” HLL indicated it would resume operations only after fully satisfying itself that the continued operation of the factory did not pose any hazard to the local environment. On March 9th, an HLL team consisting of Bhaskar, Ashok Gupta, Vivek Sood, Commercial Manager, (Exports), and B Dave, HLL’s Coordinator (Safety, Health & Environment) visited the Kodai plant. The team came to the prima facie conclusion that contaminated waste had indeed moved out of the factory.

The thermometer plant
HLL’s thermometer plant in Kodaikanal was a Pond’s legacy. In 1983, US-based Chesebrough Pond's, Pond’s India’s parent company relocated its mercury thermometer factory from Watertown, New York, to Kodaikanal. One of India’s most beautiful hill stations, located on the southern tip of the upper Palani hills in the Western Ghats, Kodaikanal was chosen as its climatic conditions were similar to those in Watertown. The low temperatures in Kodaikanal minimized the occupational hazard of mercury vaporization in the workplace. The Tamil Nadu government approved the site for the facility and declared it as an industrial estate. In 1987, the factory came into the Unilever fold when Unilever bought Cheesborough Pond's. In 1998 after Pond’s India came into its fold, HLL began to control the factory.

Though thermometers was not a core business, HLL decided to retain it to generate foreign exchange earnings, a top priority for the Indian government those days. Said to be the largest thermometer plant in the world, the factory was located on a ridge whose slopes formed a highly biodiverse forest ecosystem, (known as the Pambar Sholas) which also formed part of a watershed that drained into the picturesque Pambar river.

The thermometer factory imported mercury mostly from the United States and Spain, and glass from Germany and other countries. The factory cut and exported various types of finished thermometers to customers in USA, Latin America and Europe. The factory was split into two main sections. The first consisting of areas 1&2 took long stem glass and tubes, cut and converted them into empty thermometers. The glass scrap from these areas did not contain mercury. It was packed in corrugated cartons and had either been disposed of or was held in the customs bonded storage area on site. Between 1987 and 1989, approximately 45 tons of mercury free scrap were also buried in four shallow pits on the site, after obtaining the prior written permission of the customs and excise authorities.

The second consisting of areas 3&4 filled the thermometers with mercury, marked the scale, sealed the end and packed the thermometers. The glass scrap from these areas contained residual mercury and during the period 1984 until 1990 had been stored in the rooms of a separate building called bakery on the plant site. This untreated glass scrap contained an estimated 5.97% of residual mercury by weight. Subsequently, HLL had taken steps to recycle this mercury.

In 1990, HLL started recovering mercury using a crusher and twin recovery ovens. Approximately 68 tonnes of glass scrap from areas 3 and 4 were processed until 1998. However, this operation was not efficient. After treatment, the residual mercury in the scrap was estimated to be 1.04%. The glass was stored for further processing for mercury recovery. In early 1999, a new crusher and vacuum activated mercury recovery plant was commissioned. This new plant was able to process 80-100 kg/day of scrap glass and reduce the residual mercury to about 0.15%. This scrap too had been stored at site for further mercury recovery.

Sale of glass scrap to industrial glass recyclers commenced in 1992. A total of 98.3 tonnes of scrap was sold during the period 1992-99 and comprised 49.4 tonnes of glass scrap from areas 1&2 which contained no mercury. In addition to this, 43.6 tonnes of mercury recovered glass scrap and 5.3 tonnes of enhanced mercury recovery glass scrap from areas 3&4 were also sold. The last sale in November 1999 of 5.3 tonnes of mercury recovered glass scrap from areas 3 & 4 had been made to a scrap dealer. This was the material found at the scrap yard in Moonjikal.

Handling mercury with care
Mercury needed careful handling in view of its toxic nature. Mercury turned into vapour at ambient temperature. Inhaling mercury vapours or ingesting mercury beyond prescribed limits was likely to cause serious injury to the human body. When inhaled in excess, mercury could accumulate in the kidneys and brain and cause serious disorders of the nervous system and kidneys. The human body excreted mercury slowly. Typically, half of the mercury which might have been taken into the body was excreted in 60 days. If the level of exposure was low to moderate, natural recovery could take place. But high levels of exposure could cause brain or kidney damage.

Under Waste Category No. 4 of the Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules of 1989, any operation that generated more than 5 kg of mercury per year was considered hazardous. The site management had to ensure proper collection, reception, treatment, storage and disposal. After an amendment on January 6, 2000, wastes were considered hazardous by the regulatory authorities if the mercury concentration exceeded 50mg/kg. (See Exhibit VI for more details of Indian Environmental laws).

The applicable Occupational Heath and Safety Regulations (Tamil Nadu Factory Rules) prescribed a ceiling of 0.05 mg/m3 of mercury in the working atmosphere. Since the inception of the Kodaikanal plant, the mercury concentration in the workplace had been monitored regularly .

HLL had put in place detailed systems and controls to deal with disposal /processing of glass scrap and for the storage of wastes. To prevent any mercury from broken thermometers from evaporating, the factory floor was constantly washed with water. The washed water from the plant was led to a dedicated effluent treatment plant, where the sludge was dewatered before being packed in plastic drums and stored on site under cover. Vacuum cleaners equipped with water seals were used to collect broken thermometers whenever breakages occurred. Workers were provided with safety masks to keep out mercury vapors. Finally there was an emergency procedure. All windows were opened and the entire floor cleaned with water, when the mercury vapour concentration in air exceeded 0.05 mg/m3.

Health Monitoring
To monitor the health of workers, HLL used what it believed to be the most scientific method available – measurement of mercury level in the urine, every month, using an atomic absorption spectrometer, as per WHO standards. Any worker with mercury content in urine exceeding 100 micrograms/litre was kept away from the mercury section to allow mercury content to fall to acceptable levels. Typically, this happened within one or two months.

Employees also underwent a comprehensive annual clinical examination with specific emphasis on the oral cavity, lungs, cardiovascular system, the eyes, skin, kidneys and the central nervous system. The medical tests included blood tests and routine urine examination for albumin, red blood cells, casts, crystals and sugar. Records of all the 130 employees were available from 1988 onwards. Medical records of 184 employees/casual/contract workers who had left the company and of others whose services had been terminated in the recent past were also available.

NGO activism
Looking back, the facts seemed to indicate that in January 2001, a drum containing empty mercury bottles in a part of the Shola forests within HLL’s property had been discovered by Navroz Mody, a local resident and Greenpeace activist. This discovery seemed to trigger off Greenpeace’s activist role in the subsequent months.

On March 7, a few residents of Kodaikanal, and activists of Greenpeace, demonstrated at the factory gates. They cordoned off the scrap yard in Moonjikal, which they alleged, contained tons of mercury-containing toxic wastes from the HLL factory. They confronted the factory management with photographs of visible mercury-contaminated glass scrap and demanded immediate stoppage of mercury use in the thermometer factory. The NGOs wanted a full investigation into the extent and nature of mercury pollution caused by the factory within its premises, and in the surroundings. They insisted on a clean up of the dumpsite. The activists wanted HLL to compensate them for the loss in quality of life and acceptance of responsibility and financial liability for the damage caused to the workers, community and environment of Kodaikanal and the surrounding Palni Hills.

According to the NGOs, the contaminated glass scrap, which had been detected, was not the only toxic waste that had been inadvertently removed from the factory in breach of established procedures. They charged that at least 30 more tons of mercury-containing wastes had been sold illegally to recyclers in various parts of South India. Some unsuspecting buyers had even used the glass to make marbles for children.

The NGOs quoted one of the dealers who bought scrap from HLL , “I went to pick up scrap from the factory, and they [HLL] said I would get the other scrap only if I took the broken thermometers. Nobody told me it was illegal or that mercury is dangerous. Last year, my boys collected about half a liter of mercury but I don't know what happened to it." The toxic waste had apparently been sold to him at about Rs 1250 per ton (US $25) .

HLL’s response
After the news of the mercury leakage reached HLL headquarters, the management sprung into action and decided to suspend operations at the plant on March 8, 2001. Detailed investigations by HLL revealed that the basic manufacturing process was safe. Indeed, the process had been audited as such both internally by HLL and by the Tamil Nadu State authorities. There were clearly defined systems in place for recycling glass scrap, which took full account of the difference between clean glass scrap and glass scrap containing traces of mercury. But the investigating team consisting of Gupta, Bhaskar, Dave and Sood discovered that these procedures had been violated. This had resulted in disposal of scrap glass containing traces of mercury (about .15%), in November 1999 to a scrapyard in Munjikal. HLL’s investigations revealed that the leak had been detected by NGOs in October / November 2000, but they had decided to bring it to the notice of HLL only on 7th March 2001 .

With evidence indicating that glass scrap containing mercury had left the factory, HLL immediately informed the relevant statutory body, the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (TNPCB). Those responsible for breaching the clearly laid down procedures (and who by then were working in other units/parts of the company) were identified and subjected to disciplinary action leading to their separation from the company. R John George, who was then based in Hyderabad was appointed as the factory manager. John’s brief was to handle the situation in a hands on way, showing full sensitivity to the concerns of the local community. John recalled , “I was probably chosen because I had no reason to defend the past. I also knew the local language.”

On March 11th 2001, immediately after the decision to suspend operations at the plant, HLL decided to appoint URS Dames Moore, of Australia, for conducting a detailed environment audit. On March 15th, URS representatives arrived in Kodaikanal. By May 2001, URS had submitted its preliminary report.

HLL also engaged the services of Dr. P.N. Viswanathan (Retd) Director Grade Scientist, Industrial Toxicology Research Centre (CSIR-ITRC), Lucknow, to study the environmental and health aspects pertaining to Kodaikanal factory. On the basis of his visit to the site and study, Viswanathan came to the conclusion that “there is no evidence to show any ecological or human risks due to mercury release from the unit.” His report (submitted in March 2001) explained the reasons for his conclusions .

TNPCB set up a Working Committee to monitor the whole episode. In a meeting of the committee, held on May 28-29, 2001, HLL announced it was permanently closing the thermometer factory. HLL maintained that this decision was taken to freeze manufacturing operations to investigate the breach in the systems, if any, due to external pressure. HLL added the decision was also in line with the company’s business strategy to withdraw from all non-core businesses. This decision had been made well before the incident in Kodaikanal took place.

After receiving a formal authorisation from the working committee on June 20, 2001, HLL brought back the glass scrap lying at the Moonjikal scrap yard to its factory. This was done under the supervision of the local community and the authorities as per a detailed protocol designed by URS and approved by the Working Committee. A company statement dated June 21, 2001 explained: "Hindustan Lever Limited has retrieved, for secure storage at the site, the 5.3 tonnes of mercury containing glass scrap currently stored on a scrap dealers premises in Kodaikanal, which had been inadvertently removed from the factory in breach of established procedures."

Greenpeace representatives commented that the company's decision to clean up the scrapyard was “a clear admission of its guilt.... the Kodaikanal dumpsite is only a small portion of the company's toxic liabilities. The company's shoddy disposal of mercury wastes exposes its scant regard for the environment in countries like India where the environment regulation is lax.” Greenpeace maintained that the amount of damage caused by mercury pollution was far heavier, than was being projected by HLL.

Environment & Health Audit

In March 2001, HLL issued advertisements inviting all connected people to come for medical examination. The examination was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire developed by the US Department of Labor, Mines, Safety and Health Administration for medical surveillance and biological monitoring for miners exposed to Arsenic, Cadmium, Lead and Mercury. The clinical evaluation was supplemented by the analysis of mercury in blood and urine (through Inductively Coupled Plasma Emission Spectrometer (ICP)), the analysis of blood for hemoglobin, urine analysis for albumin and sugar, as well as the estimation of blood urea and serum creatinine (as markers for kidney functions). This clinical evaluation did not reveal any case of individual abnormality attributable to mercury exposure. No cases of gingivitis (inflammation of the gums), stomatitis (inflammation of the mucous membrane of the mouth) or skin conditions attributable to mercury exposure were found. The nervous system examination covering visual disturbance, abnormal reflexes, sensorineural disorders and co¬ordination also did not reveal any abnormality in the employees surveyed.

In May 2001, at the specific instance of Greenpeace and TNPCB, HLL invited a reputed environment consultant and toxicology expert, Tom Van Teunenbroek of TNO-MEP to conduct an environmental and health audit.

In line with Teunenbroek’s recommendations, HLL conducted additional tests. Based on the data collected and detailed analysis, Teurenbroek certified that there had been no harmful exposure to mercury amongst the employees of the Kodaikanal factory leading to chronic or acute mercury poisoning. Teunenbroek also expressed satisfaction with the methodology used for biological monitoring.

Teunenbroek concluded that there was no mercury related health risk to the employees: “I have, however, recommended a follow up study of those employees who have shown elevated levels of mercury compared to the mean. This is recommended to ensure if there are other sources of mercury exposure, which could explain these deviations. However, it must be noted that even these results are still well below the WHO recommendations of an upper limit of 100 microgram/litre.”

Greenpeace and the other NGOs were, however, not fully satisfied with Teunenbroek’s findings. Greenpeace argued that as little as 1 gram of mercury deposited annually in a lake, in the long term, could contaminate a lake spread over 25 acres and make fish from the lake unfit for human consumption. The NGOs charged that HLL's behavior violated the environmental principles of the Global Compact, that required signatories to "support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges" (Principle 7); "undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility" (Principle 8); and promote the "diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies" (Principle 9). Allegations that the company had employed double standards in relation to worker safety indicated a violation of Principle 6: "the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." The bulk of the disposal of glass scrap had occurred before the Global Compact came into existence. However, the NGOs believed at least some of the disposal and all of the denials and “cover up” had taken place after the company joined the Compact.

The NGOs also took issue with the health surveillance findings published by HLL. The NGOs mobilized some former factory workers who criticized HLL’s casual attitude towards worker safety on the shop floor . "When I worked there, they used to suck up the mercury from the floor using a vacuum cleaner once a day. In another section, where they heat thermometers in an oven, workers are exposed to gusts of mercury vapor every time the oven door is opened," stated an ex-employee who had been active in organizing the workers against HLL’s occupational safety practices.

To support their stand, the NGOs drew attention to a preliminary health survey conducted in July 2001, by the Bangalore-based Community Health Cell.[CHC] Based on their survey of 30 workers and ex-workers, CHC had reported that there were many people with "gum and skin allergy related problems, which appeared to be due to exposure to mercury." The survey added that there was a high rate of absenteeism and resignations from the job owing to health problems. "The preliminary assessment... indicates that there is a need to assess all the exposed workers in greater detail for health effects of mercury," the experts concluded. HLL managers mentioned that they had repeatedly asked for the details of this study from the CHC but no details had been received.

The results of the biological monitoring by HLL indicated that the employee group average urine mercury levels had been in the range of 15 -32 g/Lit. These levels were well within the acceptable group limits of 50 g/Lit for mercury in urine as laid down by the World Health Organisation (WHO).

The protocol for epidemiological surveillance for this study and for the review of the health surveillance conducted over the life of the factory (biological monitoring, workplace environmental monitoring, shop floor health and safety practices and clinical evaluations), had been independently studied and validated by Teunenbroek.

After Dr T Rajgopal, HLL’s Vice President (Medical & Occupational Health) made a detailed presentation to the prestigious All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) on the study, Dr Chandrakant S Pandav, a senior professor of AIIMS wrote, “Your presentation was a learning experience for the Post-Graduate and Post-Doctoral students who attended it. We look forward to receive a copy of the report and also urge you to publish the study in an international peer reviewed journal so that the larger fraternity of epidemiologists and occupational health specialists can benefit from your team’s systematic and scientific approach to the issue.”

Pandav also mentioned in his certificate (dated November 10, 2001), that the occupational health and safety measures in place at the Kodaikanal factory had succeeded in keeping the exposure of the factory employees to mercury within low levels. There was no evidence to suggest any adverse health effects that could be attributed to mercury exposure.

HLL executives also pointed to an expert committee report dated January 10, 2002, prepared by Indian Association of Occupational Health (a team of IAOH had visited the site in December 2001 to assess the situation). This report mentioned, “In view of the comprehensive occupational health measures in place and after a thorough review of the systems, procedures and findings of biochemical and clinical evaluation, the expert group believes that the health complaints like gum and skin involvement attributed to mercury exposure by some former workers may be unrelated to their past employment in the thermometer factory and other factors may be responsible for such common skin and gum morbidity.”

The Final Report of URS also concluded that, based on the available soil and water data and the medical surveillance data, the risks to human health during the operation of the plant had been insignificant and negligible. Tests conducted by URS also confirmed that there had been no mercury accumulation or impact on the ecology of the famous Kodai lake arising from the factory operations. The measurements on fish in the lake indicated that the concentrations of mercury were comparable to typical concentrations in freshwater fish as recorded in published studies.

URS provided a detailed material balance of mercury, to relate the quantity brought into the factory over the last 18 years, the quantity exported out in finished thermometers, quantity of mercury in stock, and quantity of mercury in scrap. The remaining amount represented the mercury spillage into the environment. The material balance took into account the different types of thermometers made, locally purchased as well as imported mercury and the various ways in which mercury could have leaked into the environment. The exhaustive calculations showed that even going by the worst assumptions, less than 1% of the 136.5 tonnes of mercury brought into the factory over the last 18 years had been released into the atmosphere and that too primarily through vaporisation. This translated into a discharge of approximately 75 kg per year, a figure that compared favourably with the estimated 140 tonnes released every year in USA from sources like coal-fired power stations, incinerators, and chlor alkali production plants.

Remedial Action
HLL announced it was ready to bear all the necessary expenses for exporting the mercury to USA for mercury recovery. HLL also finalized plans to recycle the accumulated scrap containing mercury, the ETP sludge & waste, decontaminate the equipment and dispose it as scrap and undertake site remediation where high levels of mercury in soil had been identified.

The TNPCB Working Committee began to supervise and monitor the remediation activities. The Working Committee accepted the URS report, which also included a detailed plan for the remediation.

URS tests revealed that mercury at concentrations between 0.1 and 10 mg per kg had been found deposited at shallow depths within the factory premises, and in limited areas to the immediate north and the south of the site, primarily from air-borne mercury during the factory’s operation over 18 years. URS felt the mercury levels in these areas would decrease naturally over time, and did not require remediation. But there were other spots inside the factory, where the soil did require remediation. HLL decided to remediate the site to 10 mg per kg or lower as per the guidelines prescribed in the Netherlands for land for residential use. These guidelines were considered to be among the most stringent in the world. The quantity of soil requiring remediation was estimated to be 4000m3, containing roughly 290kg of mercury.

At the Working Committee meeting on October 11, 2002, HLL submitted that it had been holding discussions with the US based Bethlehem Apparatus Inc., (a company approved by the US Environmental authorities), for exporting mercury containing material, and its subsequent recycling /disposal. HLL offered to export all the mercury containing glass scrap stored at site under Customs Bond ever since the factory had commenced operations in 1983 and the sludge generated in the effluent treatment plant. Raw material elemental mercury at site and finished/semi-finished thermometers would also be exported.

HLL made considerable effort to persuade both the Indian and the US Governments to permit the export. This became necessary since the US was not a party to the Basel Convention. At HLL's request, the two Governments signed a bilateral agreement for the export of mercury and the union Ministry of Environment & Forests, granted permission for the export. HLL drew up with the help of URS, an elaborate protocol for the repacking and labelling of the mercury containing materials and their safe transportation to Tuticorin port in South India for subsequent shipment to the US. Guidelines were also framed to ensure the necessary safety of personnel engaged in this operation and the monitoring of their health. This protocol was submitted to TNPCB, who on March 12, 2003 granted necessary permission for this operation. By the end of May 2003, the company had exported about 300 tonnes of the material for reprocessing.

Bhaskar recalled , “We decided to export the waste to the world’s best recycler of mercury scrap Bethlehem Apparatus. We incurred heavy expenditure, exporting the entire scrap, the effluent treatment sludge and the elemental mercury. We could have sold the elemental mercury to bonafide users in the country. Many chlor alkali plants, use tons of mercury every year and they all import it since India doesn’t produce it.”

With the export of hazardous waste duly completed, the focus shifted to dismantling the equipment and soil remediation. For decontamination of contaminated equipment in the factory premises, HLL prepared a detailed protocol, which was validated by environmental expert, Prof. Shyam Asolekar of IIT Bombay, after a first hand assessment of the Kodaikanal factory. HLL planned to store temporarily the excavated soil and the rubble from the demolished buildings within the factory premises until an appropriate site for disposal or intermediate storage pending disposal was identified by TNPCB. Once a suitable disposal site was identified, the drums would be loaded into trucks and transported. The proposal was still pending with TNPCB in mid-2004.

Labour Issues
People who had worked at the site had been requested to participate in the medical testing programme. Many did so and their reports too were available with the Chief Medical Inspector of Factories, Tamil Nadu. On the advice of the Working Committee, the results of the Medical Surveillance Study of employees had been shared with the Department of Labour and Government of Tamil Nadu's Chief Medical Inspector of Factories.

The Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories (Certifying Surgeon), Government of Tamil Nadu (Provincial Government for Kodai) who was the appropriate authority in these matters, conducted an independent health survey and concluded in his report that "the overall study reveals that the employees are healthy and sound."

The Working Committee approved HLL's decision to close the factory. It was also agreed that some employees be retained to tidy up the site and to use contractors to build further infrastructure including silt traps to prevent rainwater run-off of any mercury contaminated soil from the site.

The decision not to resume operations at Kodaikanal was communicated to the employees along with an offer to redeploy all of them in another HLL factory in Kandla, Gujarat in western India. Some workers protested at the decision and occupied the factory premises for three days. Even though HLL offered full protection of their current earnings, they were not keen on the redeployment offer. They preferred to reside in Kodaikanal and insisted on a separation package. Some of them were quite bitter at the proposal to transfer them. As one of their representatives mentioned , "This act of mass transfer is nothing but an act of victimization. The transfer orders have been issued close on the heels of the persistent demand of all of us to you to disclose the health records of all the workers, which you admittedly maintained over the years."

The matter was referred to the Deputy Labour Commissioner (DLC), Dindigul. Even as the discussions were on, HLL officials sensed that the NGOs were pressing the workers to ask for a higher package. As a senior executive mentioned, “At one stage, the NGOs demanded that even ex employees must be given an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 5 lakhs each”. Finally, after the tripartite discussions between the employees, employer and Government, a separation package several times higher than what was provided for in the prevailing statutes, was finalised. Following this, all 130 employees opted for voluntary separation by entering into individual settlements with the company. HLL requested the DLC to invite the certifying surgeon from the factories inspectorate to be present at the time of the signing of the agreement when the medical records were made available to address employee apprehensions on their health. In the settlement signed in the presence of the DLC, the workmen /union expressed satisfaction with their health status.

The road ahead
Despite all the efforts made by HLL to mitigate the impact of mercury leakage into the environment, and the future plans it had announced, the Kodaikanal plant continued to engage the attention of NGOs. At a conference organized by Greenpeace in Chennai on April 10, 2004, Dr Mohan Isaac, President of the Community Health Cell and Head of Psychiatry, National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences, Bangalore presented a paper on the Health effects of mercury exposure on HLL thermometer factory workers. Isaac’s findings were based on a site visit in 2001, during which his team had examined 30 workers of HLL. During this assessment, the team had considered work history, duration of exposure to mercury, history of workers’ symptoms and the general physical and mental status of each worker. They reported instances of bleeding / inflamed gums, shaking / falling of teeth, skin problems, besides non-specific, functional symptoms such as weakness and tiredness. They also found some cases of infertility and renal problems. Citing Isaac’s findings, the NGOs vociferously criticized HLL .

At the seminar, a former employee from the HLL factory, presented statistics to argue that the company had attempted to manipulate data about its mercury balance. HLL had reported total mercury lost into the environment of about 1750kg (1353kg into the Shola and 396 kg in soil and sediment). According to the employee, total mercury lost into the environment was 17,655 Kg. The employee ended his presentation with the demand that HLL must present before TNPCB all documents produced to URS, for verification.

HLL had proposed remediation of soil in line with the Dutch intervention standard of 10 parts per million (ppm). But Greenpeace insisted on bringing it down to 0.3 ppm, the level in virgin forests. HLL felt this was an unreasonable demand because the factory was located in an approved industrial site.

HLL’s management believed it had done all it could to bring the incident to a close. The company had invested substantial time and money in responding to the situation that had resulted following the mercury leakage. The amount invested had far exceeded the total profits generated by the plant over the entire period of operations. Yet, things were moving far too slowly. HLL wondered what more was needed to be done to close the Kodaikanal chapter once and for all.