Why was the Provisional Government so short-lived?
After the Tsar’s sudden abdication, Russia ceased to be an empire and became a republic. The Provisional Government replaced the Tsar as the new governing body and was comprised of members of the State Duma.As its title suggests, the Provisional Government was never meant to last. It was intended to provide a caretaker administration until it morphed into an All-Russian constituent assembly. However, it collapsed. This was due to a number of reasons such as it nature, various blunders and the return of exiled revolutionaries. Yet the underlying cause of its collapse seems to be the lack of resources-both military and economic-to deal with the problems it inherited and was faced with.
The nature of the Provisional Government certainly had some impact on shortening its life.It had not been appointed and therefore lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people. This reduced its political authority so the Provisional Government was very ineffective at dealing with civil unrest i.e. the chaos in the countryside. The lack of legitimacy also reduced its support, making it easier for the Bolsheviks to seize power.
The government was also not representative of wider Russian interests. Dominated by minority groups like the Octobrists and Trudoviks,the much bigger factions like the Bolsheviks and Social Democrats who represented a far wider cross-section of the Russian populace had negligible input into Provisional Government legislation. Again, this undermined its legitimacy and fuelled Lenin’s all-round condemnation of it in the April Theses. Once Lenin was able to construe the Provisional Government as so reprehensible in its manifestation as a “bourgeoisie democracy” and that as a result imminent socialist revolution was the only way forward, the proletariat became repulsed by its sole middle-class interests and the Bolsheviks were galvanised to rebel against it.
Additionally, the Provisional Government had to share power with the All-Russian Soviet which issued laws and had to be consulted on areas of policy. The contrast in ideologies weakened the Provisional Government as it made their leadership seem less defined.
However, the main reason that the All-Russian Soviet was damaging was not their stalwart left-wing disposition. It was the fact that they robbed the Provisional Government of its control of the army. Order Number1,issued by the Soviets in March 1917 required army officers to be elected by their own troops and that military orders from the Provisional Government would only be authorised if they were agreed to by the Soviet. Thus, the Petrograd Soviet had effective control of the army, depriving the Provisional Government of the complete military jurisdiction they so desperately needed to impose their authority over the rioting peasantry and Lenin’s mass demonstrations. A fierce military presence may have helped sustain the Provisional Government and hide its weakness.
Another major factor in the collapse of the Provisional Government was the crisis in the countryside. As the Provisional Government only had control over the major cities, they had no administrative body in rural Russia. Consequently, it descended into anarchy as peasants executed the process of land distribution by themselves. Violent and bloody attacks on landowners became the norm and large swathes of land were simply snatched by the peasants. Indeed peasant soldiers returned from the Front line to help and get their fair share. This chaotic, spontaneous social revolution is illustrated by the huge number (700) of complaints received in June 1917 alone about illegal attacks on property. The chaos showcased the woeful ineptitude of the Provisional Government-and how they were hopeless at imposing authority as the countryside had no effective government. This undermined the perception of the Provisional Government being in charge, making a seizure of power more realistic. Yet this crisis seems borne out of a lack of military resources. Had the Provisional Government had effective law enforcement units to combat the peasantry, the rebellion would have dissipated. But unfortunately, this was not viable.
The Provisional Government was also severely affected by the ravages of war. By March 1917 when the Provisional Government, led by Prince Lvov, replaced the Tsar, over 2 million Russian soldiers lay dead on the battlefield and millions more had been wounded or taken prisoner. Poland and parts of Western Russia had been lost to the advancing German and Austro-Hungarian forces and there was an economic crisis on the Home Front. Yet the Provisional Government continued with the harrowing war. As a result, the economy continued to deteriorate as it was overwhelmed by the cost of keeping the army fighting and morale plummeted to new depths. In desperation the June offensive was launched in Galicia to renew a crazed hope of Russian victory. The offensive caved in after two days and vicious counter-attacks led to rocketing desertions. A huge 12,000 deserters were spotted in one night. After an estimated one million desertions in total, the Russian army gradually crumbled.
This was a major affront to the authority of the Provisional Government and led to riots and demonstrations in July 1917 as Anti-Government sentiment accumulated. These demonstrations-known as the July Days-included thousands of workers taking to the streets to protest and the Tauride Palace being besieged by 50,000 demonstrators. The burden of the war engulfed the masses in serious socio-economic difficulty as there were food shortages and the land situation grew ever worse. The PG failed to address this and subsequently people were drawn to Lenin’s rallying cries of “Peace,Bread,Land”.
The war also put the Provisional Government at odds with the Soviets who only wanted to defend from attack on Russian frontiers. They were fiercely opposed to the agenda of gaining reparations and war indemnities. This greatly increased hostility that led to the Soviets being largely apathetic in 1917 to the fall of the PG.
Yet the continuation of the war was supposed to be of benefit to Russia. Kerensky, second leader of the Provisional Government hoped that Russia would gain a monetary boon from defeated opponents that would boost Russia’s ailing economy. And anyhow, Russia was receiving loans from France and Britain on the confidence that she would continue fighting These were integral to financing the Provisional Government and if Russia declared a truce, not only would loans cease but they would have to be repaid, the cost of which would be crippling. Yet if there were sufficient economic resources to start with, the war would have been discontinued with immediate effect and the PG would have been overall far more popular with war-exhausted Russia.
Another more short-term factor in the collapse of the Provisional Government was the return of exiles to Russia. Victor Chernov and Joseph Stalin returned from Siberia but most notably Lenin arrived at the Finalnd station in Petrograd in April 1917.In a torrid,90-minute speech, Lenin lambasted the Provisional Government and the imperialistic war it continued, demanding an immediate revolution, under the slogan “All power to the Soviets“. These ideas were published in communist newspaper “Pravda” and through associating the unpopular war with the Provisional Government and criticising the lack of representation, Lenin won over the Bolsheviks and innumerable workers and peasants.
Lenin’s early bids for power were ineffectual and the July Days proved a setback. But he gradually gained momentum and was finally able to persuade the Bolsheviks (they voted 10-2) to launch an armed takeover of power just a mere 7 months after the PG had been established, in which they were successful.
The Kornilov affair was the final nail in the coffin for the Provisional Government. General Kornilov, commander-in-chief of the Russian army attempted to restore order in August 1917 by ordering troops into Petrograd. The gesture was interpreted by the floundering Kerensky as a coup d’etat and ordered the arrest of Kornilov. Moreover, he armed the Bolsheviks and released many of the Marxists from prison.Yet the General was probably only trying to strengthen the Provisional Government but his actions had been the trigger of its final collapse. He never even made it to Petrograd and the Provisional Government looked pathetically paranoid and weak in light of events. What’s more Kerensky had effectively rehabilitated the Bolsheviks so they were primed to seize power. They also received phenomenal good press, dubbed as the “defenders of Petrograd“. This final blunder had wiped away any of the Provisional Governments last strands of authority. Contemporary historians were certain that it would soon be replaced.
Apart from the trigger (the Kornilov affair), all of the factors that contributed to the premature demise of the Provisional Government had their roots in a lack of resources. “Order Number 1” had put a stranglehold over their military resources hence they couldn’t effectively bring order to the countryside. Lack of military resources in terms of ammunition getting to the frontline or soldiers staying there also was a major factor in the failure to gain the upper hand in the war which is very telling, considering that numerically, Russia was by far and away the most populous nation in Europe. And the PG was unwilling to end the deeply unpopular war (that led to food shortages and the drawing of people to Lenin’s anarchism)due to lack of economic resources. But most of all,lack of resources meant that it couldn’t implement any radical change. This made Russians feel let down and disenchanted so when the Bolsheviks seized power in November, it was virtually bloodless.