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Stuxnet virus was created as a strategic plan to end and disable the Iranian nuclear plant that was called Busheur. It is alleged that the virus was created and spread by the governments of Israel and United States of America (Nakashima, Ellen, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate, 1). Systems that might have assisted to quickly build an Iranian nuclear bomb were effectively damaged and crippled by the nasty software. Stuxnet was first discovered in July 2010 when approximately 60% of infections were reported from Iran (Etalle, 3). While the United States and Israel did lead an aggressive international political campaign to get Iran to halt its nuclear program, neither country has openly admitted any involvement in this cyber-attack. There is no hard evidence that links either country to Stuxnet. Regardless, most experts believe that this cyber-attack was carried out by the two countries on Iranian computers that control centrifuges in key nuclear plants, and that it has set the country back at least a few years in its quest to build nuclear weapons. However, some researchers have discovered that the program had also spread throughout many countries worldwide.
As early as 2004 the united states intelligence agencies had identified the NEDA industrial group, an Iranian company, that had an oversight of the Natanz facility computerized industrial control system and other nuclear proliferation reports, leaked state department cables and other documents that were gleaned from the federal court cases. This was an attempt to monitor the NEDA’s efforts procurement of components that could or may be needed for creation of a nuclear weapon program.
Once the stuxnet had penetrated into the system, it had the ability to destroy or degrade the software on which it was operating. The worm covertly tries to identify and exploit some or all of the equipment’s that controls a nation’s critical infrastructure. According to the perspective of many technology observers and national security, the emergence of this worm is a risk that threatens or causes harms many activities that are deemed critical to the functioning of the modern society.
According to the perspective of many technology observers and national security, the emergence of this worm is a risk that threatens or causes harms many activities that are deemed critical to the functioning of the modern society (Theohary, Rollins & Paul, 1). The virus did not affect the functioning of a windows computer performance because it was designed to affect some specific models of programmable logic controllers. Some of the targeted computers were those that were made by Siemens and used in many automated systems like chemical plants, nuclear power plants, refineries and many others. If the computer that has been infected by the virus did not have a PLC software then the software did not have any effect. However if the target software was available, it would infect it. The virus also managed to access the PLCs and changed bits of some data on it. It was not easy to detect any changes in the PLCS because most of the end users did not understand the programming bit of the devices (Etalle, 10).The analysis of the virus indicated that it was very much specific in its operations which lead to the suggestion that it was specifically programmed and formulated to affect PLCs that were located in specific regions. This fact further explains that the developers had a target group (Etalle, 10).
Once the virus gained control with the Siemens PLC software, it compromised the frequency converters that the PLCs controlled. The converters regulated the speed of the motors through the alteration of the feed power.
Although the Iranian government denied that the worm had advance effects on its nuclear program, a nuclear inspectors report suggested that the reactors were not operational for about one week in November, 2010 (Theohary, Rollins & Paul, 1). This indicates that indeed the virus had great effects. There was a decrease in the operational centrifuges between 2009 and 2010 in Natanz. This is also attributed to the effects that were caused by Stuxnet virus. The government of Iran denied any damages to its developed nuclear program. However the results on the ground suggests otherwise. The pleading query is whether or not virus attack trespassed privacy and integrity.
Tehran had previously accused of its involvement in high level possession and enrichment in uranium that is supposedly utilized to create nuclear bombs. However these were mere speculation since there was no concrete evidence that was directed to making that conclusion. Due to this fact this attack is and should be considered as infringement of integrity through disabling of nuclear power plants and therefore disabling all the operations of other industries related to nuclear production in the country (chad, 2). Disabling the operations of unknown nuclear plants the virus developers were breaching confidentiality. Though the nonproliferation treaty limited the number of countries that should poses nuclear capabilities, speculation should not be applied and used as a scapegoat when a nation tries to infringe the technological growth of another. Previously, when required to, Iran had denied any nuclear ambitions and the country has stated that all its nuclear power plants are used for nuclear power generation only. Regardless of the fact that the Natanz plant points to the possibility of possessing high uranium enrichment, there is no evidence pointing that the plant is linked to any weapon development.
Speculations point out that the virus was launched in the year 2010 which is the same year it was detected in Iran. By the year 2012, the virus had infected more than sixty thousand computers in the world. However there is still uncertainty as to why more than half of the computers that were infected were form Iran. The architecture of the worm was very complex and it kept on improving over all the time it existed. The damages caused by the virus are not known. However a failed satellite launch in India around the July of 2010 is speculated to have been caused by this worm.
Anti-viruses software were capable of detecting and deleting it from computer windows. The virus had been developed with valid windows signatures that enabled itself to install its own drivers in the computers operating systems. Microsoft moved to revoke the licenses that were being used by the virus in the first day of its discovery but the following day it was found to contain a different license. The virus was very much complex in that it had a complete updating module (Nakashima, Ellen, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate, 1). The virus had two methods that it used to update itself. The virus checked for updates from two servers that were located in Malaysia and Denmark and it used P2P updating system where when two infections were encountered comparison of the update versions would ensure that the running one was the most recent one. The virus had also a dying date which is speculated to be June 24, 2012. The virus was set in a manner that it would delete itself automatically on that date.
Countries should use both active and passive cyber security defense methods to prevent future attacks on the systems. This active defense program may include the application of fake networks that are attached to secure networks. On that fake network, loopholes are allowed to encourage attackers to get into the network easily (Chad, 4). Through this approach it is easy to observe that target of the attacker and if possible identify and track the attacker. This approach can curb cyber-attacks effectively. Organizations should install firewall and antivirus software’s and also apply user access control, the firewall can be used to prevent attacks through continued scanning of incoming connections and establish if they are credible (Chad, 4). Antivirus scans connections that are permitted by the firewall for malicious codes. User access control outlines different rights and privileges dispensed to the computer users. These methods can help to secure a network. However they can be easily compromised. To protect systems against cyber-attacks especially for crucial facilities managed by the state, both passive and active methods of protection should be applied. However this does not pledge total security as new techniques are developed every day, the teams allocated to protect the systems should be actively involved in research and training to ensure that they are at par with the current cyber situations.

Work cited

Catherine A. Theohary, John Rollins & Paul K. Kerr. 2010. The stuxnet computer worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFAQFjAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcyberwar.nl%2Fd%2FR41524.pdf&ei=AQZOU-iaD6SCzAOejoH4Cw&usg=AFQjCNGKBGkfBdxQRK65BzbVmXTF0dzaeQ&sig2=CpwXkvpFflOA1QtEoTqMIQ&bvm=bv.64764171,d.bGQ.
Chad, Nelson. 2011. Cyber warfare: the newest battlefield. Retrieved from http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/cyberwar.pdf
Etalle, Sandro. 2010. Stuxnet explained. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CHMQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.win.tue.nl%2F~setalle%2Fpresentations%2F2010_stuxnet_sandro.pdf&ei=AQZOU-iaD6SCzAOejoH4Cw&usg=AFQjCNG78VubI49BTZmlRCzzaSG9P7AKRA&sig2=NirnX8PtJqlgAU4XfCJEDA&bvm=bv.64764171,d.bGQ
Nakashima, Ellen, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate. "US, Israel developed Flame computer virus to slow Iranian nuclear efforts, officials say." The Washington Post online (2012): 1-4.