Arianne Cerize A. Aman
The Meaning of Development: Brazil and Costa Rica Economic development is the presumed solution to absolute poverty and to many of the world's other most pressing problems. But what is development, and how do we know it when we see it? The term, development, has been used in several ways. Traditionally, it was equated with growth of per capita income. Since the 1970s, other indicators of development have become widely used by development scholars and development agencies such as the World Bank. The meeting of basic needs (or, equivalently, reduction in absolute poverty), the creation of modern employment opportunities, and the achievement of a less unequal distribution of income and farmland have all become important criteria in determining the level of development. Traditional measures of growth, especially in developing countries, may be misleading in that they fail to account for the environmental destruction that often accompanies spurts in temporary and unsustainable economic growth; and economists are devising measures of the national capital stock that includes environmental wealth. The United Nations has placed both educational attainment and health standards on equal footings with per capita income as development criteria, in the widely followed United Nations Development Program human development index (HDI). Some leading development scholars, such as Amartya Sen, Denis Goulet, and Dudley Seers, have gone further. They argue that more intangible goals, such as expanded ability to choose (including political as well as market freedoms), enhanced self-esteem, and self-actualization must be considered development criteria in their own right, if not its only meaningful measures. (For an introduction to Amartya Sen’s influential “capabilities” approach to measuring development goals, see Chapter 1 of Todaro and Smith). Thus, development is not necessarily the same as growth, although in poor countries growth is generally a precondition for meeting important development goals, such as poverty reduction. But if growth is a necessary condition for development in poor countries, it is not a sufficient condition. This case study comparing Brazil and Costa Rica brings out some of these contrasts in national development performance when different aspects of development are stressed. These two Latin American countries are good cases to examine carefully because while Brazil is often cited as an example of a country experiencing growth without development and Costa Rica is often cited as a case of successful development, a close examination of these two countries reveals the great complexity of these issues. Costa Rica is of special interest because it has stood virtually alone throughout the last century as an example of democracy and slow but steady economic development in an otherwise violent and stagnant Central America. In fact, the Costa Rican government was very active in efforts to bring peace to the Central American region in the 1990s. Brazil is of special interest because its growth performance from the 1960s through the 1980s was the best in Latin America, with at least some parallels with East Asian policy and performance (see Cases 2, 3, and 15). At the same time, other indicators of development in Brazil lagged, eventually undermining growth prospects. Without being torn apart by civil war and benefiting from much higher incomes than Central American countries, it would seem that Brazil should have been in a much better position to fight extreme poverty and improve economic and social equity. Instead, it has continued to see an extremely high percentage of its population in extreme poverty for an upper middle income country, and remains one the countries with the highest levels of inequality in the world. Average Income and Human Development Levels. In 2000, Brazil’s per capita income was $3,750. Using purchasing power parity (PPP–see Todaro and Smith, chapter 2), its average income was $7,320. In Costa Rica, income per capita had reached $3,960 by 2000, with a $PPP income of $8,250. In Brazil, growth has been highly erratic, with large swings over time. In Costa Rica, growth has been modest but respectable and relatively steady. When the first edition of this case study was written, the income rankings of these two countries were reversed. But Costa Rica was rated then as well ahead of Brazil on human development and poverty reduction, and with this lead–in the kind of economic development that really counts–it was anticipated that Costa Rica could surpass Brazil in standard economic measures as well. Costa Rica still maintains a substantial human development lead, as reflected in the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (for a full overview, see Todaro and Smith, chapter 2). As of 1999 (the most recent data available as of July 2002), Costa Rica had attained high human development status, ranking 41st in the world, six positions higher than would have been predicted using its income rank alone. In contrast, Brazil ranked 69th, twelve positions lower than would be predicted by its income. These differences are largely accounted for by gaps in health and education performance. Costa Rica's life expectancy at birth in 2000 was 77 years, the same as in the United States. But in Brazil, life expectancy at birth in 2000 was just 67 years. Similarly, Brazil's under-five mortality. rate is 40 per thousand, compared with just 14 in Costa Rica. In the education sphere, Brazil's adult literacy rate is 85%, while that of Costa Rica is 95%. Helping to explain this difference, in Costa Rica, six years of school attendance are mandatory and 99% attendance is reported. Inequality. A comparison of the distribution of income in the two countries can be seen in Table 1, derived from various World Bank World Development Reports. Table 1: Some Comparisons Between Brazil and Costa Rica. Income Brazil Costa Rica 2000 per capita income $3,750. $3,960 2000 PPP per capita income $7,320. $8,250. Poverty: percent below $1 per day 9.0% 6.9% Inequality Percent share in: Quintile Brazil Costa Rica Lowest 20% 2.1% 4.0% Second quintile 4.9% 9.1% Third quintile 8.9% 14.3% Fourth quintile 16.8% 21.9% Highest 20% 67.5% 50.8% Highest 10% 51.3% 34.1% Brazil Costa Rica Gini coefficient .59 .46

Brazil Costa Rica Growth Growth, GDP per capita, 1965-1990 1.4% 3.3% Growth, GDP per capita, 1990-2000 1.5% 3.4% Gary Fields concluded that relative inequality substantially increased in Brazil from the early sixties to the early seventies. This trend continued through the 1970s, as the World Bank estimated the Gini coefficient measure of inequality in Brazil to have risen from .565 in 1970 to .590 in 1980. Increases in inequality were largest in the agricultural sector. In 1980 the top 5% of farms comprised 69.3% of the farmland in Brazil. Most observers have concluded that an even steeper increase in income inequality took place in Brazil during the 1980s, as is confirmed by comparing income distribution data in successive World Development Reports. In recent years inequality in Brazil has slightly moderated but seems to have leveled off at a high rate, comparable to 1980. But inequality in Costa Rica is also fairly high and only appears low in comparison to an extremely unequal country like Brazil. (For full details on measures of inequality, as well as poverty, and their significance, see Todaro and Smith, chapter 6.) Poverty. Fields concluded that the proportion of Costa Ricans below the absolute poverty line fell from 20% to 10% from the early sixties to the early seventies. In Brazil in this period Fields estimated the decline as from 37% to 35.5%. In the 1990s, absolute poverty declined in both countries (see World Development Report, 1990, 2000), but it is apparently rising again in Brazil. In 2000, 25.4% of the population of Brazil lived on less than $2 per day, compared with about 23.3% in Costa Rica. Brazil also suffers from a very high incidence of child labor for its income level, as a December 2001 World Bank study and reports by the International Labor Office have underlined. As many as seven million children still work in Brazil, despite the country having officially made the eradication of child labor a priority. The problem is not unknown in Costa Rica, where the minimum working age is lower than that of compulsory education, an anomaly that may be interpreted as a wink and a nod at the problem. But the scope of the problem is comparatively modest. (For an analysis of the problems of child labor and appropriate child labor policies, see Todaro and Smith, chapter 9). What lies behind these very different outcomes? Costa Rica's background. Costa Rica's modern development history begins with its 1948 revolution, and the broad-based development policies that emerged in its wake. The country has retained its democratic system since then, a rare exception in a region in which most countries have experienced extended periods of military rule in the postwar period. This democratic system should not be overly glamorized—the president holds substantial personal power; the legislative branch has tended to be inefficient and politically weak; central government power has expanded at the expense of local jurisdictions; and citizen participation is modest at best. The tax system in Costa Rica is quite regressive, like most countries in Latin America. The country experienced a 1980s armed right-wing movement associated with the contras. U.S. military and economic aid has been significant, but two-edged. A 1980s scandal involved allegations that American aid funded a "parallel state"—one that drew part of its budget from high central bank interest payments on undisbursed USAID funds—and whose activities were directed at undermining Costa Rica's government-directed development policies. But elections are open and fair; the press is free; and there is substantial feedback from the governed to the government. In the 1980s, democracy survived encroachment by contras and their local supporters, and Nicaragua's Sandinistas fighting them. The dominant party since the 1948 revolution has been the National Liberation Party (PLN), traditionally social democratic but market-oriented in economic policy outlook. The stability of its democracy and consensus of its moderate development policies were confirmed when the moderate conservative Rafael Angel Calderon was elected president in 1990. In large measure he continued the policies of the previous PLN president Oscar Arias. Elections have continued at regular four-year intervals; most recently, Abel Pacheco of the Social Christian Unity Party, a psychiatrist and former television commentator, was elected president in 2002. In sum, Costa Rica has had among the most democratic histories in the developing world, even if it falls short by Western standards. At a time when the stability of democracy is being questioned again in South America in the wake of the Argentina crisis, Costa Rica has been completely stable despite its own economic slump. In the traditional view of Costa Rica's economic history, its better human development performance in relation to its Latin American neighbors is due in no small part to its agrarian system, one that is said to be comprised mostly of humble but secure and solvent yeoman farmers. This differs from Latin America's characteristic Latifundia-Minifundia system, with its highly unequal distribution of land and sharp class distinctions (See Todaro and Smith, chapter 10). In this view, the historical differences are due in part to Costa Rica's lack of factors such as natural resources or a large native American population that would otherwise have drawn Spanish elites, who created the Latifundia-Minifundia system elsewhere in Latin America, to Costa Rica in the colonial period. Historically, Costa Rica has had a larger yeoman farmer sector than most other countries in Latin America. But this difference of degree should not be exaggerated into a difference of kind, as it has often been. Latifundia have always been an important part of the rural economy in the northern Pacific region and elsewhere. An agricultural census found that 36.9% of the landholders hold only 1% of the farmland. The land Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, was a staggering .86, exceeded elsewhere in Latin America but perhaps nowhere else. Costa Rica's land reform efforts are commendable in the Latin American context, but should also not be overemphasized. The 1961 Law of Lands and Land Settlement, passed despite the strenuous resistance of land owners, provided for possibilities of land redistribution. But in the first decade of its implementation only about 4% of farmland was affected. A spurt of implementation in the mid-1970s came to a halt by the end of the decade. James Rowles concluded that implementation of the law has depended on the balance of political forces, not on the law itself. It is still largely incomplete. In sum, although the people of Costa Rica have benefited from its comparatively better agrarian system, including its better opportunities for rural economic mobility, the agrarian system is an incomplete explanation for the country's human development performance. Other policies have been important contributors to development in Costa Rica. In the early 1960s, Costa Rica shifted attention from import substitution to export promotion. This was a timely change: countries that made this shift in the early 1960s, notably South Korea and Taiwan, have had striking development success (see cases 2 and 15, and Todaro and Smith chapter 13). Costa Rica differs from those economies, however, in that its exports have been more concentrated in agriculture. The largest traditional crop is coffee, which together with bananas, meat, sugar, and cocoa comprised 70% of export earnings in the 1970s. Costa Rica has had some success in nontraditional agriculture, such as decorative yucca, however. Costa Rica also emphasized agricultural infrastructure and extension programs. Development policy in Costa Rica paralleled that of the successful experiences of Taiwan and South Korea in a number of ways, albeit on a smaller scale. Several of these policies, including mandatory education, led directly to human development. Until the mid-1980s, Costa Rica continued to have a highly state-directed economy. Costa Rica experienced an economic crisis from 1980 to 1982, including a rise in oil prices, sharp inflation, a serious debt crisis, recession and high unemployment, and, in response, moved to a more market-directed economy, trends that have continued into the 21st century. Brazil's background. Gross domestic product in Brazil in the 1965 to 1980 period grew at an extraordinary 9% rate, and while the growth rate in the 1980s and 1990s fell to 3.3% and 2.9% respectively, this performance was still significantly better than most other countries of Latin America. Brazil’s population growth has been higher than the regional average, somewhat reducing the per capita growth gap with its neighbors. Industrial and export policies played an important role in Brazil's successes prior to 1980 and to its comparative success among Latin American countries since 1980. Its percentage share of manufactured exports in total exports has grown dramatically, owing in part to this extensive industrial policy system. Manufactures comprised about 42% of total exports in the early 1990s, tied with Uruguay for the highest share in Latin America. By 2000, this figure reached 54%. Actually, in 1980, the figure was substantially higher, nearly 57%, up from just 18% in 1965, all using World Bank data. In the 1980s, Brazil was forced by its debt crisis to expand exports in the quickest and easiest ways possible; this has often meant commodity exporting, often at high environmental cost (see case 11) as well as longer-run economic cost as primary prices decline. Costa Rica also has a huge foreign debt and has suffered similarly under its weight. But it has done more to promote ecotourism and other strategies to help mitigate rainforest destruction. Brazil has had an export policy stressing incentives for manufacturing exports, with numerous parallels with Taiwan and South Korea. Its pattern of combined import substitution and export promotion policies is strongly reminiscent of East Asian policy. For example, the World Bank found a "pro-export bias" in 11 of 21 industrial subsectors. Further, Fabio Erber found that tax incentives have been combined with the requirement that importers of parts and components export certain levels of final goods, in order to encourage exports in the electronics industry. A study by Renalto Bauman and Helson Braga of the role of selective financing in Brazil and concluded that "the subsidies involved in official credit have an important individual role in (explaining) exports, especially as regards industrialized products." Brazilian capital goods exports have grown dramatically since the late 1960s when they were targeted for industrial policy promotion. Morris Teubal concludes on the basis of in-depth case studies that their success is due to first building up reputation and learning by doing in protected domestic markets. It is at this point (and not before), he concludes, that the export subsidy has been effective at encouraging a switch to export activities. As Werner Baer argues, Brazil has taken major strides toward industrialization since World War II. It has impressive production statistics in the growth of its systems of paved roads, electricity generation and industrial output, including over one million cars, three million televisions and two million refrigerators per year. Agricultural output has similarly grown. The average material standards of the country have improved substantially. Progress on social development has also been made; although the child mortality rate is quite poor by the standards of comparable countries today, like most developing countries Brazil has made great progress from 1960 when its rate was 159 per thousand to 1990's 83 per thousand, and today’s 40 per thousand. But this has been more by default than through any proactive social policy. And such strides do not automatically propel a nation to advanced industrial status, a lesson underscored by the economic history of the former Soviet Union. Brazil's human development statistics compare unfavorably with many other middle-income countries such as Costa Rica and quite a few low-income countries, let alone with the advanced industrialized countries. As many as one-third of all children under the age of five suffer from malnutrition in Brazil, despite the nation's plentiful food supply. The dramatic contrasts of Brazil are often expressed with the saying that it is "a Belgium inside an India," which is an exaggeration but a telling one. Brazil labors under one of the developing world's highest debt levels, at over $240 billion. It was one of the last debt crisis countries to arrive at a debt reduction agreement under the Brady plan. A debt pact for Brazil was finally reached in 1994. From 1982 to 1995, the rate of investment was actually negative (-0.9% annually in the 1980-87 period), absolute poverty has increased significantly, and income distribution, already one of the worst in the world, has worsened further. The country faced another debt crisis in 1998, leading to the float of the real. This presaged a similar crisis in Argentina in 2001. While it has been widely believed in the World Bank and IMF that Brazil would avoid spillover from the Argentina crisis because of its earlier adjustment, this is not assured. The threat of crisis in Brazil is an ongoing and serious one, as the instability leading up to the 2002 elections suggests. It is not enough to say that industrialization and social progress have been derailed by a debt crisis, for a debt crisis is in large part endogenous, or the result of previous economic and social policies. A country that finds it easier to take on foreign debt than institute needed reforms will eventually suffer consequences. Land reform, which has been repeatedly blocked by the political power of Latifundia owners, is a key case in point. In Brazil, unequal land distribution produces political incentives to encourage poor farmers to establish inefficient rain forest settlements. The northwest state of Rondonia has experienced the most devastation, beginning with the 1970s construction of roads to the area and the encouragement of low-income farmers to move there. This policy represented a politically inexpensive—but ecologically disastrous—alternative to land reform. In fact, highly unequal patterns of land ownership soon asserted themselves in Rondonia (see Case 11). Brazil and Costa Rica: Further Contrasts. Gary Fields, in his classic book Poverty Inequality and Development, examined Brazil and Costa Rica among other countries and concluded that "deliberate unevenness is the central feature of Brazilian growth," while Costa Rica's "emphasis on agricultural exports helped spread the benefits of growth throughout the country" and that "the Costa Rican economy grew, creating more modern sector job opportunities and educating the skilled labor force needed." The size of Brazil in comparison to Costa Rica is not an adequate basis to dismiss the differences. For example, a 1993 World Bank study found that while Brazil's average per capita income grew by 220% from 1960 to 1980 with a 34% decline in the share of the poor in the population, similarly-sized Indonesia grew 108% from 1971 to 1987 with a 42% decline in poverty incidence. Much ground on poverty was subsequently lost in Brazil in the 1980s. One interpretation is that in the 1990s, Brazil's growth without, at least, much social development has created conditions in which growth itself is no longer possible unless attention is given to broader development goals. Brazil has been described as a nation of voter apathy and weariness with politicians. Brazilians called on to choose among a king, a prime minister, or a president to run their country voted to retain the presidential system of government in a plebiscite. As president, Fernando Collor de Mello ordered a price freeze and the temporary seizure of 80 percent of private savings—over $110 billion—in an attempt to squeeze out liquidity, which he assumed would cause hyperinflation. The savings seizure destroyed confidence in financial assets and in the government itself, especially because government debt comprised 80 percent of the assets seized, offering the state an expedient means of reducing its expenses. Brazil's chronic inflation resides mainly in expectations and in government credit and credibility. President de Mello was impeached on corruption charges and resigned in 1993. The 1993 resignation of Paulo Haddad, Brazil's second finance minister to resign in a two-month period, sapped an already low level of confidence. Some hope was returned to Brazil in October 1994 when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected president. Cardoso had devised a more effective anti-inflation campaign as finance minister in 1993 to 1994. A former leftist sociology professor turned moderate free market reformer as leader of the Social Democratic Party, Cardoso is a politician of considerable skill and determination. It was widely perceived that if any leader were capable of bringing both political and economic reform to Brazil despite its enormous institutional inertia, it was Cardoso. Unfortunately, Cardoso’s administration became embroiled in scandal and crisis. As of summer 2000 the political future is uncertain, with the left-wing labor leader Luiz Inacio Lulu da Silva, known universally as Lulu, leading in polls; but he has led in the polls in previous elections only to be overtaken by election day. Costa Rica's foreign policy is "permanent neutrality"; it has no army by constitutional statute, and its police force has no modern military weaponry. In contrast, the military has long been powerful in Brazil, frequently playing a decisive role in politics and acting in its own institutional interests or siding with the landed oligarchy. Race and racial discrimination is another area in which Brazil and Costa Rica differ markedly. Few discussions about poverty in Brazil pay much attention to race. But over half the population of Brazil is African or Mulatto in origin. This makes Brazil the second largest black nation, after Nigeria. And most of the poor in Brazil are black. While racism is a crime in Brazil, no one has ever been sent to jail for it. Hundreds of children living on the streets of Brazil's large cities are murdered each year; and most of these are black. According to one estimate the average black worker receives only 41% of the salary of the average white worker. Most of the million-plus Brazilians living in the worst favelas, or slums, are black. The endemic extreme poverty of the Northeast afflicts mainly black descendants of slaves. Black representation in government is shockingly rare, even in the states where blacks represent a majority of the population. University places are overwhelmingly claimed by whites. On a personal note, I have taught short courses on development economics to Brazilian civil servants for many years, and despite my complaints, I believe only three of the hundreds of officials who have been assigned to my lectures were black or mulatto. Brazil desperately needs a movement comparable to the civil rights struggle in the U.S. of the 1960s, but in the absence of overt Jim Crow laws, it is sometimes hard to identify the appropriate target. Some form of affirmative action may be the only way to begin to overcome the problem. In Costa Rica, descendants of the Spanish are a majority, while a sizable minority are Indian or Mestizo (compared with just 1% in Brazil). About 5% are black, generally of West Indian descent. Though there is widespread racism and discrimination against blacks, they have achieved a great deal of upward mobility compared with most countries in Latin America. Many have become landowners employing whites as farm workers. Conclusion. In this case study, a close examination of Brazil and Costa Rica has revealed the great complexity of the "growth without development" issues. Structural features of the two countries differ more by degree than by kind. In the case of Brazil, it might be more accurate to say that there has been considerable economic development without much social development, rather than the more blanket term "growth without development" that applies better to a few Middle Eastern and other energy-exporting countries. And other differences between Brazil and Costa Rica, besides policies that might account for human development performance, are obvious: for example, Brazil is by far the largest and most populous country in Latin America, while Costa Rica in contrast is a small open economy. But although broad generalizations cannot be made, the case study does bring out vividly the important idea that growth and development can be two very different matters, and that inattention to social aspects of development will likely act as an eventual brake on continued economic development.